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STATE AND MUNICIPAL SEWER SYSTEM 
AUTHORITY LIABILITY UNDER CERCLA: WHO 
SHOULD PAY FOR THE CLEANUP OF HAZARDOUS 
INDUSTRIAL AND COMMERCIAL SEWER 
DISCHARGES? 
Peter R. Hinckley* 
1. INTRODUCTION 
For over twenty years, industrial customers of the Washington 
Suburban Sanitary Commission (WSSC) discharged hazardous sub-
stances into the sewer system.1 The WSSC's regulations permitted 
such discharges until 1983.2 The WSSC, however, expected its small 
industrial customers to continue to discharge hazardous substances 
into the sewer system even after the WSSC promulgated more strin-
gent regulations.3 The WSSC also failed to maintain and repair the 
sewer system properly.4 Hazardous substances subsequently leaked 
onto property that surrounded the sewer system.5 A federal district 
court found the WSSC liable for the resulting clean-up costs under 
the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Li-
ability Act (CERCLA).6 
State and municipal sewer system authorities across the United 
States could face liability similar to that confronted by the WSSC. 
* Executive Editor, 1994-1995, BOSTON COLLEGE ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS LAW REVIEW. 
1 Westfarm Assocs. L.P. v. International Fabricare Inst., No. HM-92-9, 1993 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 15921, at *2-3 (D. Md. July 16, 1993). 
2 See id. at *5. 
3 See id. at *24. 
4 See id. at *4. 
5 See id. at *3. 
6 [d. at *25. 
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Publicly-owned sewer systems7 provide sewage and wastewater dis-
posal services for domestic, industrial, and commercial customers.9 
Industrial and commercial customers discharge hazardous substances 
into public sewers.lO Such discharges may result in hazardous waste 
contamination to property that surrounds the sewer system.ll The 
contamination in turn may produce CERCLA12 ramifications for pub-
lic sewer system authorities. 
The extent of public sewer system authority liability under CER-
CLA is unclear.13 Public sewer system authorities appear to fall within 
CERCLA's broad scope of liability.14 CERCLA, however, contains 
exceptions to liability under appropriate circumstances.15 Whether 
7 There are three types of sewer systems: storm sewers, which carry runoff from roads, 
parking lots, and other surfaces to the nearest receiving channel or body of water; sanitary 
sewers, which carry domestic and commercial sewage and industrial wastewater to treatment 
plants; and combined sewers, which carry surface runoff and sanitary sewage to treatment 
plants. KARL IMHOFF ET AL., KARL IMHOFF'S HANDBOOK OF URBAN DRAINAGE AND WASTE-
WATER DISPOSAL 5 (Vladimir Novotny ed., 1989). The latter two types of sewer systems are 
the subjects of this Comment. 
8 Wastewater consists primarily of water used for sanitation (i.e., personal hygiene and 
drinking), cooling, processing (i.e., making goods, washing products, waste byproduct removal, 
and transportation), and cleaning and maintenance. [d. at 89. 
9 [d. at 5; NANCY J. SELL, INDUSTRIAL POLLUTION CONTROL: ISSUES AND TECHNIQUES 68 
(2d ed. 1992). 
10 See SELL, supra note 9, at 22. Residential sewer users also discharge hazardous substances 
into public sewers. See id. at 68. However, several factors weigh against residential users from 
being targeted for CERCLA clean-up costs. Residential users do not dispose of hazardous waste 
to the same extent as industrial and commercial users. [d. Individual residential users also do 
not possess the "deep pockets" necessary to finance clean-up costs. Residential users are also 
indirectly assessed CERCLA costs through taxes used to support government cleanup. See 
infra note 32. 
11 See, e.g., Westfarm Assocs. L.P. v. International Fabricare Inst., No. HM-92-9, 1993 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 15921, at *3 (D. Md. July 16, 1993); Lincoln Properties, Ltd. v. Higgins, 823 F. Supp. 
1528,1532 (E.D. Cal. 1992). The quantity of industrial and commercial wastes is about the same 
as the quantity of residential waste. See IMHOFF ET AL., supra note 7, at 89 (excluding cooling 
water discharged by electric power industry, wastewater production from urban areas is about 
evenly divided between domestic and industrial sources). Industrial and commercial wastes, 
however, pose a greater threat of hazardous waste contamination because such wastes are far 
more likely to contain hazardous substances than domestic waste. OM PRAKASH KHARBANDA 
& ERNEST A. STALLWORTHY, WASTE MANAGEMENT: ToWARDS A SUSTAINABLE SOCIETY 6 
(1990); SELL, supra note 9, at 22, 68. 
12 Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980 (CER-
CLA), Pub. L. No. 96-510, 94 Stat. 2767, as amended by the Superfund Amendments and 
Reauthorization Act of 1986 (SARA), Pub. L. No. 99-499, 100 Stat. 1613 (codified at 42 U.S.C. 
§§ 9601-9675 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992». CERCLA is also known as the "Superfund." The name 
"Superfund" derived from SARA. 
13 See discussion infra part II.B.1. 
14 See discussion infra part II.B.1. 
15 See discussion infra part II.C. 
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public sewer system authorities may fall within an exception will 
determine the proper extent of CERCLA liability. 
The direct and indirect monetary costs associated with the cleanup 
of a contaminated site are enormous. The average clean-up costs of 
one CERCLA site amounts to twenty-four million dollars.16 CER-
CL.A:s potential for financially crippling liability, and the statute's 
allowance for contribution,17 have prompted parties to seek recovery 
and contribution of response costs from other parties in order to 
reduce their portion of clean-up costs.IS There lies growing concern 
among state and municipal sewer system authoritiesI9 that industrial 
and commercial parties liable or potentially liable under CERCLA for 
the disposal of hazardous substances20 into publicly-owned sewer sys-
16 William H. Rodgers, Jr., A Superfund Trivia Test: A Comment on the Complexity of the 
Environmental Laws, 22 Envtl. L. 417, 422 (1992); see U.S. CONGRESS OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY 
ASSESSMENT, ARE WE CLEANING Up? 10 SUPERFUND CASE STUDIES: A SPECIAL REPORT OF 
OTA's ASSESSMENT ON SUPERFUND IMPLEMENTATION 9 (1988) (outlining 10 case studies of 
CERCLA sites with estimated clean-up costs ranging from $800,000 to $45 million). Average 
clean-up costs do not include transaction costs that are likely to be incurred during the clean-up 
process, which can amount to additional millions of dollars. See generally, JAN PAUL ACTON & 
LLOYD S. DIXON, SUPERFUND AND TRANSACTION COSTS: THE EXPERIENCES OF INSURERS 
AND VERY LARGE INDUSTRIAL FIRMS 43-49 (1992). 
17 See 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4)(B) (1988). In addition, any party may commence a civil action on 
its own behalf for injunctive relief and civil penalties against any person "alleged to be in 
violation of any standard, regulation, conditions, requirements, or order" under CERCLA. 42 
U.S.C. § 9659 (1988). 
18 See Robert G. Torricelli, Municipality Liability Under Superfund-A Legislative Re-
sponse, 16 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 491,495 (1992); see, e.g., Westfarm Assocs. L.P. v. International 
Fabricare Inst., No. HM-92-9, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15921, at *6 (D. Md. July 16, 1993). 
19 State and municipal sewer system authorities are subject to CERCLA liability. Under 
CERCLA, "[tlhe term 'person' means an individual, firm, corporation, association, partnership, 
consortium, joint venture, commercial entity, United States Government, State, municipality, 
commission, political subdivision ofa State, or any interstate body." 42 U.S.C. § 9601(21) (1988) 
(emphasis added); see Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1,8-13 (1989) (holding that states 
are "persons" for purposes of CERCLA liability); B.F. Goodrich Co. v. Murtha, 958 F.2d 1192, 
1198-99 (2d Cir. 1992) (holding that municipalities may be held liable under CERCLA); Wickland 
Oil Terminals V. Asarco, Inc., 654 F. Supp. 955, 957 (N.D. Cal. 1987) (holding that states and their 
political subdivisions are "persons" within the meaning of CERCLA). 
CERCLA, however, provides that "[tlhe term 'owner or operator' does not include a unit of 
State or local government which acquired ownership ... involuntarily ... by virtue of its 
function as sovereign." 42 U.S.C. § 9601(20)(D) (1988). The exclusion does not apply "to any 
State or local government which has caused or contributed to the release ... of a hazardous 
substance .... " [d. CERCLA further provides that "[nlo State or local government shall be 
liable ... for costs or damages as a result of actions taken in response to an emergency created 
by the release or threatened release of a hazardous substance generated by or from a facility 
owned by another person" unless there is gross negligence or intentional misconduct on the part 
of the government. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(d)(2) (1988). 
20 "Hazardous substances" are chemicals that Congress has designated as hazardous under 
several other federal environmental statutes. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(14) (1988). 
The term "hazardous substance" means (A) any substance designated pursuant to 
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terns will seek contribution of response costs from public sewer sys-
tem authorities.21 
[d. 
section 1321(b)(2)(A) of title 33, (B) any element, compound, mixture, solution, or 
substance designated pursuant to section 9602 of this title, (C) any hazardous waste 
having the characteristics identified under or listed pursuant to section 3001 of the 
Solid Waste Disposal Act [42 U.S.C. 6921] (but not including any waste the regulation 
of whim under the Solid Waste Disposal Act [42 U.S.C. 6901 et seq.] has been sus-
pended by Act of Congress), (D) any toxic pollutant listed under section 1317(a) of title 
33, (E) any hazardous air pollutant listed under section 112 of the Clean Air Act [42 
U.S.C. 7412], and (F) any imminently hazardous chemical substance or mixture with 
respect to which the Administrator has taken action pursuant to section 2606 of title 
15. The term does not include petroleum, including crude oil or any fraction thereof 
which is not otherwise specifically listed or designated as a hazardous substance under 
subparagraphs (A) through (F) of this paragraph, and the term does not include natural 
gas, natural gas liquids, liquefied natural gas, or synthetic gas usable for fuel (or 
mixtures of natural gas and such synthetic gas). 
CERCLA authorizes the Administrator of the EPA to promUlgate regulations qualifying 
hazardous substances: 
The Administrator shall promulgate and revise as may be appropriate, regulations 
designating as hazardous substances in addition to those referred to in section 9601(14) 
of this title, such elements, compounds, mixtures, solutions, and substances which, 
when released into the environment may present substantial danger to the public 
health or welfare or the environmental, and shall promulgate regulations establishing 
that quantity of any hazardous substances the release of which shall be reported 
pursuant to section 9603 of this title. 
42 U.S.C. § 9602(a) (1988). 
Federal regulations provide a consolidated list of elements, compounds, and hazardous wastes 
that are designated as hazardous substances under 42 U.S.C. § 9601(14). 40 C.F.R. § 302.4 (1993). 
There is no quantitative threshold that must be reached before a court may find that a 
hazardous substance has been released for purposes of CERCLA liability. See, e.g., Arizona v. 
Motorola, Inc., 774 F. Supp. 566, 571 (D. Ariz. 1991); Louisiana-Pacific Corp. v. ASARCO, Inc., 
735 F. Supp. 358, 361 (W.D. Wash. 1990); United States v. Nicolet, Inc., 712 F. Supp. 1205, 1207 
(E.D. Pa. 1989). But see Amoco Oil Co. v. Borden, Inc., 889 F.2d 664, 669-71 (5th Cir. 1989) 
(imposing a quantity requirement on the imposition of liability in an attempt to limit the scope 
thereof despite the fact that the "plain statutory language fails to impose any quantitative 
requirement on the term 'release"'). 
21 See Court Denies Reconsidemtion Motion in Case Finding State Agency Liable for Sewer 
Leaks, [24 Current Developments] Env't Rep. (BNA) 1205 (Oct. 29, 1993); Robert Schmidt, 
More Litigation in the Pipeline? A First: Sewage Systems Found Liable for Cleanup, Legal 
Tinles, Sept. 13, 1993, at 2. 
Although the EPA, as a matter of policy, overlooks generators or transporters of municipal 
solid waste when suing for response costs under CERCLA, the EPA treats state and municipal 
owners and operators the same as any other PRP for purposes of CERCLA liability. See Interim 
Policy on CERCLA Settlements Involving Municipalities or Municipal Wastes, 54 Fed. Reg. 
51,071 (1989); see also Municipalities Should Be Held Liable for Cleanup Only by EPA, 
Witnesses Say, [24 Current Developments] Env't Rep. (BNA) 11 (May 7, 1993). The most likely 
scenario for public sewer authority liability under CERCLA, however, involves third party suits 
against public sewer authorities by private parties seeking contribution for response costs. 
Illustrative of states' and municipalities' cause for concern is United States v. Montrose Chem. 
Corp. 827 F. Supp. 1453 (C.D. Cal. 1993). In Montrose, the District Court for the Central District 
of California approved a $45.7 million CERCLA consent decree between the United States and 
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This Comment examines public sewer system liability under CER-
CLA for industrial and commercial customers' hazardous discharges 
that leak prior to reaching sewage treatment facilities. Section II 
examines CERCLA's language and legislative history and analyzes 
public sewer system liability under the statute, focusing on the "owner 
and operator" provision and the third party affirmative defense. Sec-
tion II also reviews a current Congressional initiative that attempts 
to clarify the issue of municipal sewer system liability under CER-
CLA. Section III sets forth, compares, and reconciles the two federal 
district court decisions that confronted the issue of public sewer sys-
tem liability under CERCLA. Section IV asserts that various policy 
considerations caution against the imposition of liability on a public 
sewer system authority absent a showing of responsibility for con-
tamination. Finally, Section V offers conclusions and proposes certain 
steps that public sewer system authorities may take to avoid liability 
under CERCLA. 
II. PUBLIC SEWER SYSTEM AUTHORITY LIABILITY UNDER 
CERCLA's STATUTORY SCHEME 
Determination of the scope of public sewer system authority liabil-
ity begins by looking at CERCLA's plain language.22 Public sewer 
system authorities, although not specifically mentioned in CERCLA, 
fall within the statute's broad scope of liability as owners and opera-
tors of sewer systems.23 CERCLA's third party affirmative defense, 
however, provides a possible means by which public sewer system 
authorities may successfully be able to avoid CERCLA liability.24 
A. CERCLA Background 
In 1980, Congress passed CERCLA in response to growing 
public concern over hazardous substance contamination.25 Since its in-
151 local governments and government agencies. Id. at 1455. The basis of the CERCLA action 
consisted of allegations that hazardous substances disposed into sewer systems by industrial 
and government customers then discharged into the ocean via outfall pipes contaminated the 
ocean. See id. at 1455. Municipal sewer districts were to pay about three quarters of the $45.7 
million consent decree. See Kim M. Johannessen, Special Liability Issues and Case Law Update 
under Superfund, C851 A.L.I.-A.B.A. 303, 327 (1993). 
22 See infra notes 44-45 and accompanying text. 
23 See infra notes 46--50 and accompanying text. 
24 See infra notes 87-95 and accompanying text. 
25 See Wickland Oil Terminals v. Asarco, Inc., 792 F.2d 887, 890 (9th Cir. 1986) ("Congress 
enacted CERCLA in 1980 to provide a comprehensive response to the problem of hazardous 
substance release"); H.R. REP. No. 1016, 96th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1, at 22 (1980), reprinted in 
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troduction, CERCLA's scope of liability has been a steady sub-
ject of litigation26 and scholarly commentary.27 Primarily enacted to 
remedy hazardous waste contamination,28 CERCLA attempts to 
achieve its goal through the designation of potentially respon-
sible parties (PRPS).29 PRPs implement and finance the cleanup 
of facilities30 contaminated by the release31 of hazardous 
1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6119, 6125 (Congress enacted CERCLA ''to initiate and establish a compre-
hensive response and financing mechanism to abate and control the vast problems associated 
with the abandoned and inactive hazardous waste disposal sites"). 
26 See Owen T. Smith, The Expansive Scope of Liable Parties Under CERCLA, 63 ST. JOHN'S 
L. REV. 821, 837 (1989) ("CERCLA's implementation has resulted in considerable litigation, 
coupled with the actual cleanup of only a handful of sites"). 
27 See Beverly Z. Alexander, Comment, CERCLA 1980-1985-A Research Guide, 13 ECOL-
OGY L.Q. 311 (1986) (describing over one hundred scholarly commentaries organized within an 
outline of 24 various CERCLA topics). 
28 See, e.g., United States v. Alean Aluminum Corp., 964 F.2d 252, 257-58 (3d Cir. 1992) ("[i]n 
response to widespread concern over the improper disposal of hazardous wastes, Congress 
enacted CERCLA, a complex piece of legislation designed to force polluters to pay for costs 
associated with remedying their pollution"); B.F. Goodrich Co. v. Murtha, 958 F.2d 1192, 1197 
(2d Cir. 1992) ("[i]n CERCLA Congress enacted a broad remedial statute designed to enhance 
the authority of the EPA to respond effectively and promptly to toxic pollutant spills that 
threaten[] the environment and human health"). 
29 See Smith, supra note 26, at 822. 
30 
The term "facility" means (A) any building, structure, installation, equipment, pipe or 
pipeline (including any pipe into a sewer or publicly ()UJned treatment works), 
well, pit, pond, lagoon, impoundment, ditch, landfill, storage container, motor vehicle, 
rolling stock, or aircraft, or (B) any site or area where a hazardous substance has been 
deposited, stored, disposed of, or placed, or otherwise come to be located; but does not 
include any consumer product in consumer use or any vessel. 
42 U.S.C. § 9601(9) (1988) (emphasis added). 
Congress deliberately made the definition of "facility" expansive. See, e.g., 3550 Stevens Creek 
Assocs. v. Barclays Bank of Cal., 915 F.2d 1355, 1360 n.lO (9th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 
2014 (1991); New York v. Shore Realty Corp., 759 F.2d 1032, 1043 n.15 (2d Cir. 1985); United 
States v. Mottolo, 695 F. Supp. 615, 622 (D.N.H. 1988). 
31 
The term "release" means any spilling, leaking, pumping, pouring, emitting, emptying, 
discharging, injecting, escaping, leaching, dumping, or disposing into the environment 
(including the abandonment or discarding of barrels, containers, and other closed 
receptacles containing any hazardous substance or pollutant or contaminant), but 
excludes (A) any release which results in exposure to persons solely within a work-
place, with respect to a claim which such persons may assert against the employer of 
such persons, (B) emissions from the engine exhaust of a motor vehicle, rolling stock, 
aircraft, vessel, or pipeline pumping station engine, (C) release of source, byproduct, 
or special nuclear material from a nuclear incident, as those terms are defined in the 
Atomic Energy Act of 1954 [42 U.S.C. 2011 et seq.], if such release is subject to 
requirements with respect to financial protection established by the Nuclear Regula-
tory Commission under section 170 of such Act [42 U.S.C. 2210], or, for the purposes 
of section 9604 of this title or any other response action, any release of source bypro-
duct, or special nuclear material from any processing site designated under section 
7912(a)(I) or 7942(a) of this title, and (D) the normal application of fertilizer. 
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waste.32 Hazardous waste cleanup must be performed in accordance 
with a designated national contingency plan (NCP).33 PRPs may seek 
contribution for response costs incurred in the cleanup of a contami-
nated facility from other parties who may be liable for the targeted 
contamination.34 
42 U.S.C. § 9601(22) (1988). 
Courts interpret "release" expansively and do not require any active human participation. 
See, e.g., Nurad, Inc. v. William E. Hooper & Sons Co., 966 F.2d 837, 845 (4th Cir.), cert. denied 
sub nom. Mumaw v. Nurad, Inc., 113 S. Ct. 377 (1992); Westfarm Assocs. L.P. v. International 
Fabricare Inst., No. HM-92-9, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15921, at *16 (D. Md. July 16, 1993); 
Lincoln Properties, Ltd. v. Higgins, 823 F. Supp. 1528, 1536 (E.D. Cal. 1992). 
Parties have attempted to avoid CERCLA liability by arguing that the original disposal of 
hazardous waste into a public sewer system and not the subsequent release from the sewer is 
a "release." See Westfarm Assocs., 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15921, at *15. Courts, however, have 
refused to allow this "passive third party" defense. See id. at *15-16; Lincoln Properties, 823 F. 
Supp. at 1536. 
32 If a PRP is not designated, a "Superfund" pays for clean-up costs. 42 U.S.C. § 9611 (1988). 
The Superfund also underwrites cases in which PRPs do not agree to pay for cleanup and the 
government finances the cleanup and later sues to recover the costs of the cleanup. See 26 U.S.C. 
§ 9507 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992); 42 U.S.C. §§ 9604, 9607(a)(4)(A) (1988); see also 42 U.S.C. 
§ 9607(a)(4)(B) (1988) (private parties who initiate own site cleanup may recover clean-up costs 
as long as costs are not inconsistent with the national contingency plan). General federal 
revenues, taxes on chemical and petroleum industries, money recovered from CERCLA and 
other environmental statutes, CERCLA penalties, and CERCLA punitive damages finance the 
Superfund. See 26 U.S.C. § 9507(b) (1988). 
33 42 U.S.C. § 9605 (1988). The NCP establishes requirements that parties must follow before 
they may recover response costs. Id. Federal regulations set forth the organizational structure 
and procedures for preparing for and responding to CERCLA violations in accordance with the 
NCP. See 40 C.F.R. §§ 300.1-.1105 (1993). Response costs, in order to be recoverable, must not 
be inconsistent with the NCP. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4)(A), (B) (1988); J.V. Peters & Co., Inc. v. 
Administrator of the EPA, 767 F.2d 263, 266 (6th Cir. 1985). 
34 Chemical Waste Management, Inc. v. Armstrong World Indus., Inc., 669 F. Supp. 1285, 
1291-92 (E.D. Pa. 1987). When the government successfully sues defendants for violating 
CERCLA, the government may be entitled, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 9607(c)(3) (1988), to recover 
its actual response costs plus up to three times the amount of response costs as punitive 
damages. See United States v. Parsons, 936 F.2d 526, 528 (11th Cir. 1991). Designated PRPs 
have a cause of action for contribution against other PRPs under 42 U.S.C. § 9613(f)(1): 
Any person may seek contribution from any other person who is liable or potentially 
liable under section 9607(a) of this title, during or following any civil action under 
section 9606 of this title or under section 9607(a) of this title. Such claims shall be 
brought in accordance with this section and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and 
shall be governed by Federal law. In resolving contribution claims, the court may 
allocate response costs among liable parties using such equitable factors as the court 
determines are appropriate. Nothing in this subsection shall diminish the right of any 
person to bring an action for contribution in the absence of a civil action under section 
9606 or section 9607 of this title. 
42 U.S.C. § 9613(f)(1) (1988). 
Clean-up costs recoverable under CERCLA include not only the direct costs associated with 
the removal of hazardous waste but also site testing, studies, and similar direct or indirect 
response costs that are consistent with the NCP. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4)(B)-(D) (1988); see United 
States V. Bogas, 920 F.2d 363, 369 (6th Cir. 1990) ("[c]leanup [sic] costs recoverable under 
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CERCLA imposes broad-based liability on PRPS.35 CERCLA li-
ability is retroactive,36 strict,37 and is joint and several where the harm 
is indivisible.3s CERCLA also imposes liability without regard to cau-
sation in cases of actual contamination.39 Thus, an owner of a facility 
that does not produce hazardous substances may nevertheless be held 
liable under CERCLA for the cleanup of hazardous substances that 
CERCLA include not only the direct cost of removal, but of site testing, studies, and similar 
'response costs,' direct and indirect"); see also Mottolo, 695 F. Supp. at 631 (providing examples 
of the types of response costs that may be recoverable in a CERCLA action). 
When a court fashions a remedy in an action under § 9613(0(1), the court possesses broad 
discretion and may use "such equitable factors as the court determines are appropriate," such 
as ownership and operation of the contaminated site, the source of the contamination, and the 
cause of the release of the contamination. 42 U.S.C. § 9613(0(1) (1988); see United States v. R.W. 
Meyer, Inc., 932 F.2d 568, 571-72 (6th Cir. 1991); United States v. Union Gas Co., 35 Env't Rep. 
Cas. (BNA) 1750, 1757 (E.D. Pa. 1992). 
35 See, e.g., United States v. Alcan Aluminum Corp., 964 F.2d 252, 258 (3d Cir. 1992) ("CER-
CLA is a remedial statute which should be construed liberally to effectuate its goals''); B.F. 
Goodrich Co. v. Murtha, 958 F.2d 1192, 1198 (2d Cir. 1992) ("[CERCL.Ns] broad reach extends 
liability to all those contributing to-from generation through disposal-the problems caused 
by hazardous substances"); 3550 Stevens Creek Assocs. v. Barclays Bank of Cal., 915 F.2d 1355, 
1363 (9th Cir. 1990) ("[CERCLA] is to be given a broad interpretation to accomplish its remedial 
goals"), eert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 2014 (1991). 
36 See, e.g., O'Neil v. Picillo, 883 F.2d 176, 183 n.12 (1st Cir. 1989), eert. denied,493 U.S 1071 
(1990); United States v. Monsanto Co., 858 F.2d 160, 173-74 (4th Cir.), eert. denied, 490 U.S. 1106 
(1988); Abbott Lab. v. Thermo Chern, Inc., 790 F. Supp. 135, 138 (W.D. Mich. 1991). 
37 Although CERCLA does not expressly provide for strict liability, courts have interpreted 
the statute so based upon, among other things, the statute's legislative history. See, e.g., General 
Elec. Co. v. Litton Indus. Automation Sys., Inc., 920 F.2d 1415, 1418 (8th Cir. 1990), eert. denied, 
499 U.S. 937 (1991); Monsanto, 858 F.2d at 167 & n.11; United States v. Northeastern Pharma-
ceutical & Chern. Co., 810 F.2d 726, 732 n.3 (8th Cir. 1986), eert. denied, 484 U.S. 848 (1987). 
CERCL.Ns strict liability, however, is not absolute. New York v. Shore Realty Corp., 759 F.2d 
1032,1042 (2d Cir. 1985). The statute contains limited affirmative defenses to liability. See infra 
notes 87-91 and accompanying text. 
38 Although CERCLA does not expressly provide for joint and several liability, courts have 
interpreted the statute to provide for such liability. See, e.g., Monsanto, 858 F.2d at 171; Versatile 
Metals, Inc. v. Union Corp., 693 F. Supp. 1563, 1571 (E.D. Pa. 1988); United States v. North-
ernaire Plating Co., 670 F. Supp. 742, 748 (W.D. Mich. 1987). 
CERCLA allows apportionment when harm is divisible. See O'Neil, 883 F.2d at 178; Mon-
santo, 858 F.2d at 171-72. However, PRPs who seek to limit CERCLA liability on the basis that 
the harm is divisible must prove that the harm is apportionable and that there is a reasonable 
and rational basis for apportionment of the harm. See United States v. Mottolo, 695 F. Supp. 
615,629 (D.N.H. 1988). 
39 See, e.g., Ohio v. United States Dep't of the Interior, 880 F.2d 432, 471 (D.C. Cir. 1989); 
Monsanto, 858 F.2d at 170; Shore Realty, 759 F.2d at 1044. In contrast, courts require a showing 
of causation when there is threatened, but no actual, release of hazardous substances. See 
Westfarm Assocs. L.P. v. International Fabricare Inst., No. HM-92-9, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
15921, at *20 (D. Md. July 16, 1993) ("only in the case of threatened releases does it appear that 
a plaintiff must demonstrate any degree of causation"); City of New York v. Exxon Corp., 766 
F. Supp. 177, 193 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) ("better [interpretation of 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)] is that only a 
threatened release must cause response costs"). 
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are located at the facility.40 To establish a prima facie case of liability 
under CERCLA, a plaintiff seeking contribution must establish that 
(1) the contaminated site is a facility; (2) a release or threatened 
release of a hazardous substance from the site has occurred; (3) the 
release or threatened release has caused the plaintiff to incur re-
sponse costs; and (4) the defendant falls within a recognized category 
of PRPS.41 Only once the four requirements have been met may a 
party be subject to CERCLA liability. 
B. Public Sewer System Authorities as PRPs 
1. PRPs under CERCLA 
Of the four requirements needed to establish a prima facie case 
of CERCLA liability, the last requirement-that the defendant fall 
within a recognized category of PRPs-presents the most difficulty 
with regard to public sewer system authority liability.42 CERCLA 
recognizes four broad-based categories of PRPs: (1) the owners and 
operators43 of a vessel or a facility; (2) the parties who owned or 
operated any facility during the time at which hazardous substances 
40 Shore Realty, 759 F.2d at 1043-44. 
41 See, e.g., United States v. Aceto Agric. Chems. Corp., 872 F.2d 1373, 1378-79 (8th Cir. 1989); 
Ascon Properties, Inc. v. Mobil Oil Co., 866 F.2d 1149, 1152-53 (9th Cir. 1989). 
42 Although CERCLA exempts from liability "any consumer product in consumer use," 42 
U.S.C. § 9601(9) (1988), the exemption does not extend to sewage or wastewater. The exemption 
applies only to useful consumer products and not material that is disposed of by parties. See 
Dayton Indep. Sch. Dist. v. U.S. Mineral Prods. Co., 906 F.2d 1059, 1065 (5th Cir. 1990) ("[tJhe 
provision exempting consumer products obviously was meant to protect from liability those who 
engage in production activities with a useful purpose, as opposed to those engaged in the 
disposal of hazardous substances") (footnote omitted); see also Vernon Village, Inc. v. Gottier, 
755 F. Supp. 1142, 1150--51 (D. Conn. 1990) (drinking water that contained hazardous wastes a 
consumer product in consumer use); Electric Power Ed. of Chattanooga v. Westinghouse Elec. 
Corp., 716 F. Supp. 1069, 1080 (E.D. Tenn. 1988) (electrical transformers that leaked toxic fluid 
a consumer product in consumer use); Knox v. AC & S, Inc., 690 F. Supp. 752, 756 (S.D. Ind. 
1988) (building insulation that contained asbestos might be considered a consumer product in 
consumer use "to the extent that insulation is a commercial product, sold between businesses"). 
Thus, neither sewage nor wastewater constitute a "consumer product in consumer use" and is 
not exempted by CERCLA's "consumer product" provision. 
4.3 42 U.S.C. § 9601(20)(a) (1988) (see infra note 46 for text). Although § 9607(a)(1) imposes 
liability on the "owner and operator" of a vessel or a facility, courts construe the phrase so as 
to extend liability to either owners or operators. As the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh 
Circuit stated: 
Although the "owner and operator" language of § 9607(a)(1) is in the conjunctive, we 
construe this language in the disjunctive in accordance with the legislative history of 
CERCLA and the persuasive interpretations of other federal courts. Additionally. we 
note that § 9607(a)(2) is phrased in the disjunctive. We can perceive no rational expla-
nation, other than careless statutory drafting, for imposing liability upon "owners or 
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were released; (3) the generators of the hazardous substances re-
leased at a facility; and (4) the transporters of hazardous substances.44 
Public sewer system authorities are neither specifically included nor 
excluded as a CERCLA-designated PRp'45 Public sewer system authori-
ties, however, appropriately fall within the "owner or operator" PRP 
category. 
CERCLA imposes liability upon the owners and operators46 of facili-
ties where the release of hazardous substances has occurred.47 The 
application of owner and operator liability to public sewer system 
authorities is consistent with CERCLA's statutory language. The 
statutory definitions of "owner" and "operator"--which simply state 
the terms' plain meanings--provide little interpretive guidance.48 Public 
sewer system authorities, however, fall within the plain language of 
operators" under one section but only holding "owners and operators" liable under 
another section. 
United States v. Fleet Factors Corp., 901 F.2d 1550, 1554 n.3 (11th Cir. 1990), cen. denied, 498 
U.S. 1046 (1991) (citations omitted and emphasis in original); see Tanglewood E. Homeowners 
v. Charles-Thomas, Inc., 849 F.2d 1568, 1573 (5th Cir. 1988); Guidice v. BFG Electroplating & 
Mfg. Co., 732 F. Supp. 556, 561 (W.D. Pa. 1989). 
4442 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(I)-(4) (1988). 
45 See id. 
46 
The term "owner or operator" means (i) in the case of a vessel, any person owning, 
operating, or chartering by demise, such vessel, (ii) in the case of an onshore facility 
or an offshore facility, any person owning or operating such facility, and (iii) in the case 
of any facility, title or control of which was conveyed due to bankruptcy, foreclosure, 
tax delinquency, abandonment, or similar means to a unit of State or local government, 
any person who owned, operated or otherwise controlled activities at such facility 
immediately beforehand. Such term does not include a person who, without participat-
ing in the management of a vessel or facility, holds indicia of ownership primarily to 
protect his security interest in the vessel or facility. 
42 U.S.C. § 9601(20)(A) (1988). 
The term "owner or operator" does not include a unit of State or local government 
which acquired ownership or control involuntarily through bankruptcy, tax delin-
quency, abandonment, or other circumstances in which the government involuntarily 
acquires title by virtue of its function as sovereign. The exclusion provided under this 
paragraph shall not apply to any State or local government which has caused or 
contributed to the release or threatened release of a hazardous substance from the 
facility, and such State or local government shall be subject to the provisions of this 
chapter in the same manner and to the same extent, both procedurally and substan-
tively, as any non governmental entity, including liability under section 9607 of this 
title. 
42 U.S.C. § 9601(20)(D) (1988). 
4742 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(1), (2) (1988). 
48 The definition of "owner," "any person owning ... such facility," 42 U.S.C. § 9601 (20)(A)(ii) 
(1988), is circular and provides little guidance as to what parties are liable under CERCLA. See 
Kaiser Aluminum & Chern. Corp. v. Catellus Dev. Corp., 976 F.2d 1338, 1341 (9th Cir. 1992). The 
statutory definition of "operator," "any person ... operating such facility," 42 U.S.C. 
§ 9601(20)(A)(ii) (1988), is similarly circular and unrevealing. 
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CERCLA's "owner and operator" category because public sewer sys-
tem authorities own and operate sewer facilities from which hazard-
ous substances may leak.49 The inclusion of public sewer system authori-
ties as owners and operators also is consistent with courts' expansive 
interpretation of the terms.5O Unless there exists some explicit or 
implicit liability exception for public sewer system authorities, they 
may be subject to liability under CERCLA's plain language as the 
owners and operators of sewer systems. 
CERCLA's legislative history provides little guidance into the mean-
ing and application of the terms owner and operator.51 The legislative 
history that does exist, however, provides no indication of any express 
or implied exception to owner and operator liability for public sewer 
system authorities. Rather, the legislative history reflects Congres-
sional desire to interpret the terms as broadly as possible.52 The 
extension of owner and operator liability to public sewer system 
authorities is consistent with such a broad scope of liability. 53 
49 See supra notes 7-11 and accompanying text. 
50 Under courts' broad interpretation of owners and operators, parties that are subject to 
liability as PRPs include creditors, lessees and sublessees, parent and successor corporations, 
and corporate officers and shareholders. See, e.g., United States v. Kayser-Roth Corp., 910 F.2d 
24, 27 (1st Cir.) (parent corporation liability), eert. denied, 498 U.S. 1084 (1990); United States 
v. Fleet Factors Corp., 901 F.2d 1550, 1556-58 (11th Cir. 1990) (creditor liability), cert. denied, 
498 U.S. 1046 (1991); Smith Land & Improvement Corp. v. Celotex Corp., 851 F.2d 86, 91 (3d 
Cir.) (successor corporation liability), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 1029 (1988); New York v. Shore 
Realty Corp., 759 F.2d 1032, 1052 (2d Cir. 1985) (corporate officer and shareholder liability); 
United States v. South Carolina Recycling and Disposal, Inc., 653 F. Supp. 984, 1003 (D.S.C. 
1984) (lessee liability), afI'd in part, vacated in part sub nom. United States v. Monsanto Co., 
858 F.2d 160, (4th Cir. 1988), eert. denied, 490 U.S. 1106 (1989). 
51 Because CERCLA was hastily drafted, the statute poses more interpretation problems 
than other statutes. Frank P. Grad, A Legislative History of the Comprehensive Environmental 
Response, Compensation and Liability ("Superfund'~ Aet of 1980,8 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 1,2 
(1982) ("[iJn the instance of the 'Superfund' legislation, a hastily assembled bill and a fragmented 
legislative history add to the usual difficulty of discerning the full meaning of the law"); see, e.g., 
United States v. Alcan Aluminum Corp., 964 F.2d 252, 258 n.5 (3d Cir. 1992) ("CERCLA was 
passed in great haste during the waning days of the 96th Congress. As a result the statute is 
riddled with inconsistencies and redundancies"); United States v. Mottolo, 605 F. Supp. 898, 902 
(D.N.H. 1985) ("CERCLA has acquired a well-deserved notoriety for vaguely-drafted provi-
sions and an indefinite, if not contradictory, legislative history"). 
The legislative history behind the meaning of the terms owner and operator is of little 
assistance. See H.R. REP. No. 172, 96th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1, at 36-37 (1980), reprinted in 1980 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 6160, 6181-82 (stating that owners ''include not only those persons who hold title 
... but those who, in the absence of holding a title, possess some equivalent evidence of 
ownership" and that an operator is a party "carrying out operational functions for the owner of 
the facility pursuant to an appropriate agreement"). 
52 See supra note 51. 
53 See Lincoln Properties, Ltd. v. Higgins, 823 F. Supp. 1528, 1535 (E.D. Cal. 1992); see also 
Westfarm Assocs. L.P. v. International Fabricare Inst., No. HM-92-9, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
15921, at *2 (D. Md. July 16, 1993). 
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Courts often look to the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act 
(RCRA)54 and the Clean Water Act (CWA)55 for assistance in the 
interpretation of CERCL.A:s terms and the application of CERCLAs 
provisions.56 Neither RCRA nor the CWA, however, support the pos-
sibility of an implicit exception to owner and operator liability for 
public sewer system authorities. Public sewer system authorities fall 
within RCR.A:s scope of liability as the "owners and operators of 
facilities for the treatment, storage, or disposal of hazardous waste."57 
RCRA contains an exception which excludes domestic sewage and 
mixtures that contain domestic sewage from RCR.A:s scope of liabil-
ity.58 Thus, under the exception, industrial and commercial sewage 
54 Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976 (RCRA), Pub. Law No. 94-,580, 90 Stat. 
2795 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6992 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992)). RCRA establishes 
a program for the management of hazardous waste from its origin to its ultimate disposal to 
ensure that the means of disposal of hazardous waste will prevent escape of those wastes into 
the environment and provides an enforcement mechanism to ensure compliance with the pro-
gram. See B.F. Goodrich Co. v. Murtha, 958 F.2d 1192, 1201 (2d Cir. 1992); Hazardous Waste 
Treatment Council V. South Carolina, 945 F.2d 781, 783 (4th Cir. 1991). While CERCLA's focus 
is remedial, RCRA's focus is preventative. B.F. Goodrich Co., 958 F.2d at 1202. 
55 Clean Water Act of 1977 (CWA), Pub. L. No. 95-217, 91 Stat. 1566 (codified as amended at 
33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992)). The CWA establishes a comprehensive program 
for the control and eradication of water pollution. Train v. City of New York, 420 U.S. 35, 37 
(1975). 
56 See Grad, supra note 51, at 35; see also 42 U.S.C. § 9601(32) (1988) (CERCLA liability is 
construed as the standard of liability under the CWA); United States v. Shell Oil Co., 605 F. 
Supp. 1064, 1070 (D. Colo. 1985) (CERCLA must be construed in light of previous statutes 
relating to environmental protection, notably RCRA). Looking to RCRA and the CWA is 
particularly appropriate in this situation, since there is an absence of guidance in the statute 
and legislative history as to the liability of public sewer system authorities. 
57 42 U.S.C. § 6924(a) (1988). 
58 42 U.S.C. § 6903(27) (1988). 
The term "solid waste" means any garbage, refuse, sludge from a waste treatment 
plant, water supply treatment plant, or air pollution control facility and other discarded 
material, including solid, liquid, semisolid, or contained gaseous material resulting from 
industrial, commercial, mining, and agriculture operations, and from community activi-
ties, but does not include solid or dissolved material in domestic sewage . ... 
Id. (emphasis added). 
Domestic sewage includes domestic sewage and "[aJny mixture of domestic sewage and other 
wastes that passes through a sewer system to a publicly-owned treatment works for treatment." 
40 C.F.R. § 261.4(a)(l)(i) and (ii) (1992). The domestic sewage exception covers industrial and 
commercial waste discharged into sewer systems containing domestic waste, even if the indus-
trial and commercial waste would be considered hazardous if disposed of by other means. EPA 
Administered Permit Regulations, 55 Fed. Reg. 30,082 (1990); see Comite Pro Rescate de la 
Salud V. Puerto Rico Aqueduct And Sewer Auth., 888 F.2d 180, 184...,'37 (1st Cir. 1989), cert. 
denied, 494 U.S. 1029 (1990). Such industrial and commercial discharges, however, could subject 
a public sewer system authority to potential liability under the CWA. See infra notes 65-66 and 
accompanying text; see also H.R. REP. No. 899, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., at 23 (1965), reprinted in 
1965 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3608, 3628 ("[tJhe term 'solid waste disposal' is defined to exclude organic 
solids in untreated domestic sewage, which are already subject to the [CWA],,). 
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mixed with domestic sewage is exempted from RCRA liability. 59 The 
domestic sewage exception provides an indirect exemption to RCRA 
liability for public sewer system authorities engaged in the disposal 
of waste that is purely or partially composed of domestic waste.60 
Although the domestic sewage exception indirectly exempts public 
sewer system authorities under RCRA in limited circumstances, the 
exception does not indicate any implicit exception to CERCLA liabil-
ity for public sewer system authorities. Rather, the existence of RCRA's 
domestic sewage exception supports the conclusion that public sewer 
system authorities may be owners and operators under CERCLA. 
Congress knew about RCRA's domestic sewage exception when it 
enacted CERCLA. Congress, however, failed to include in CERCLA 
any provisions similar to the domestic sewage exception.61 The failure 
to create any type of sewage or sewage facility exception for CER-
CLA in the face of the known RCRA exclusion supports the conclu-
sion that no exception was intended for CERCLA. Even if the domes-
tic sewage exception did extend to CERCLA, courts have held that 
the focus of the exception is not the waste disposal facility involved 
but the source of the waste involved.62 Thus, for example, a public 
sewer system authority would be subject to liability if purely indus-
trial or commercial waste were discharged into a sewer system.63 
Because the focus of the exception is not the waste disposal facility 
involved but the type of sewage, public sewer system authorities 
would fall within CERCLA's owner and operator provision. Thus, 
RCRA's domestic sewage exception does not implicitly exempt public 
sewer system authorities from falling within CERCLA's owner and 
operator provision. 
The CWA also supports public sewer system authority status as 
an owner and operator under CERCLA. Far from excluding public 
sewer system authorities from liability, the CWA includes such enti-
ties within its regulatory umbrella.64 All public sewer system authori-
59 See Comite Pro Rescate, 888 F.2d at 186, 188; see also EPA Administered Permit Regula-
tions 55 Fed. Reg. 30,082. 
60 See Comite Pro Rescate, 888 F.2d at 184, 187-88. Public sewer system authorities and their 
customers, however, could still face liability under the CWA. 
61 See B.F. Goodrich Co. v. Murtha, 958 F.2d 1192, 1200 (2d Cir. 1992) (analyzing CERCLA's 
legislative history and concluding that CERCLA's definition of "hazardous substance" makes 
no distinction upon whether the substance's source was industrial, commercial, or domestic). 
62 See Comite Pro Rescate, 888 F.2d at 184-87. 
63 See id. at 188; Westfarm Assocs. L.P. v. International Fabricare Inst., No. HM-92-9, 1993 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15921, at *31 (D. Md. July 16, 1993). 
64 The CWA refers to public sewer system authority facilities as "publicly-owned treatment 
works" (POTWs). See 33 U.S.C. §§ 1292(2), 1311(b)(I)(A)-{B) (1988). 
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ties must monitor and regulate the discharge of hazardous substances 
through the use of aN ational Pollutant Discharge Elimination System 
(NPDES) permitting system.65 If a public sewer system authority 
releases hazardous substances in violation of the NPDES, the author-
ity is subject to criminal, civil, and administrative penalties for the 
violation.66 
In summary, CERCLA broadly extends liability to the owners and 
operators offacilities.67 Public sewer system authorities fall within the 
plain language of this category of PRP.68 Nothing in CERCLA sup-
ports the exclusion of public sewer system authorities as owners or 
operators. Both RCRA and the CWA, which provide guidance regard-
ing CERCLA's scope of liability, support the imposition of owner and 
operator liability for public sewer system authorities. Thus, given 
CERCLA's plain language and the lack of any explicit or implicit 
exception to the plain language liability, public sewer system authori-
ties must be considered owners and operators under CERCLA.69 
2. The Proposed Toxic Cleanup Equity Act of 1993 
Recognizing that municipal sewer system authorities fall within the 
scope of CERCLA liability, members of Congress have attempted on 
several occasions to amend CERCLA in order to protect these enti-
ties from liability.70 One of the recent amendment initiatives began in 
1991, when members of Congress proposed the Toxic Cleanup Equity 
and Acceleration Act of 1991.71 The legislation was modified and rein-
troduced in both houses of Congress as the Toxic Cleanup Equity and 
Acceleration Act of 1993 (TCEAA).72 The TCEAA was subsequently 
65 See 33 u.s.c. §§ 1311(b)(1)(B)-{C), 1342(a) (1988). The CWA also imposes pretreatment 
standards on industrial and commercial discharges into public sewer systems. See 33 U.S.C. 
§ 1317(b)(1) (1988). A discussion of public sewer system authority liability under the CWA for 
the discharges of industrial and commercial customers is beyond the scope of this Comment. 
6633 U.S.C. § 1319(c), (d), (g) (1988 & Supp. IV 1992); see Stoddard v. Western Carolina 
Regional Sewer Auth., 784 F.2d 1200, 1208 (4th Cir. 1986). 
67 See supra note 44. 
68 See supra notes 46--{j0 and accompanying text. 
69 See Westfarm Assocs. L.P. v. International Fabricare Inst., No. HM-92-9, 1993 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 15921, at *2, *20 (D. Md. July 16, 1993) (holding that public sewer system authority may 
be liable under CERCLA as an owner and operator of a sewer system); Lincoln Properties, Ltd. 
v. Higgins, 823 F. Supp. 1528, 1535 (E.D. Cal. 1992) (same). 
70 See infra notes 71-74 and accompanying text. 
71 The Toxic Cleanup Equity and Acceleration Act of 1991, H.R. 3026, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. 
(introduced July 24, 1991); S. 1557, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (introduced July 25, 1991). 
72 The Toxic Cleanup Equity and Acceleration Act of 1993 (TCEAA), S. 343, 103d Cong., 1st 
Sess. (introduced Feb. 4, 1993); H.R. 870, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (introduced Feb. 4, 1993). 
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revised and expanded in scope by its sponsors.73 The modified version 
of the TCEAA in turn was reintroduced in both houses of Congress 
in May, 1993, as the Toxic Cleanup Equity Act of 1993 (Equity Act).74 
In addition to Congressional support, these reform efforts have re-
ceived endorsement from major national environmental and municipal 
organizations.75 Neither the Equity Act nor its predecessor, however, 
have been enacted by Congress. 
The Equity Act attempts to clarify and modify municipal liabil-
ity issues under CERCLA.76 Municipal sewer system liability under 
CERCLA and the potential for the imposition of financially crippling 
contribution and recovery costs have caused a great deal of concern 
among officials at all levels of government.77 The Equity Act, a re-
sponse to such concern,78 places various limits and exemptions on 
municipality79 liability under CERCLA. Among the relief mechanisms 
located in the Equity Act that protect municipalities are caps on 
municipal liability and limits on payments that municipalities would 
pay for CERCLA response costs.SO The Equity Act also contains 
73 See 139 CONGo REC. S5948 (daily ed. May 13, 1993) (statement of Sen. Lautenberg). 
74 The Toxic Cleanup Equity Act of 1993 (Equity Act), S. 965, l03d Cong., 1st Sess. (introduced 
May 13, 1993); H.R. 2137, l03d Cong., 1st Sess. (introduced May 17 1993). The Equity Act was 
first introduced on May 13, 1993. The Equity Act's principal sponsors are Senator Frank 
Lautenberg (Dem.-N.J.) in the Senate and Representative Robert Torricelli (Dem.-N.J.) in the 
House of Representatives. ld. 
75 139 CONGo REC. S5948 (daily ed. May 13, 1993) (statement of Sen. Lautenberg) (noting the 
approval of the Equity Act by the National League of Cities, the National Association of 
Counties, the United States Conference of Mayors, the National Association of Towns and 
Townships, the Sierra Club, the Environmental Defense Fund, the Natural Resources Defense 
Council, the United States Public Interest Research Group, and Friends of the Earth). 
76 S. 965 § 2. 
77 The purpose of the Equity Act is to "amend [CERCLA] to provide relief to local taxpayers, 
municipalities, and small businesses regarding the cleanup of hazardous substances ... " 139 
CONGo REC. S5948 (daily ed. May 13, 1993). The Equity Act also recognizes that "many of the 
Nation's local governments are facing a financial crisis, and their ability to provide essential 
public services is being threatened ... " S. 965 § 2. 
78 See id. 
79 ld. at § 3(A). 
ld. 
The term "municipality" means any political subdivision of a State and may include 
cities, counties, villages, towns, townships, boroughs, parishes, schools, school districts, 
sanitation districts, water districts, and other local government entities. The term also 
includes any natural person acting in his or her official capacity as an official, employee, 
or agent of a municipality. 
80 See id. at § 3. The Equity Act directs most of its attention to providing relief for munici-
palities against liability for the generation and transportation of municipal solid waste (MSW). 
For an analysis of the effects of the Equity Act on municipal liability for the transport and 
disposal of MSW, see James J. Reardon, Jr., Comment, Limiting Municipal Solid Waste Liabil-
ity Under CERCLA- Towards the Toxic Cleanup Equity and Acceleration Act of 1993,20 B.C. 
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favorable settlement provisions for municipalities that are found li-
able under CERCLA.81 
The Equity Act also contains a provision that specifically addresses 
municipal sewer system authority liability. The Equity Act would 
exempt municipalities from liability based solely upon municipal own-
ership or operation of a sewer system.82 Under section 3(B) of the 
Equity Act: 
[I]n no event shall a municipality incur liability under this Act for 
the acts of owning or maintaining a public right-of-way over which 
hazardous substances are transported, or of granting a business 
license to a private party for the transportation, treatment, or 
disposal of municipal solid waste or sewage sludge. For the pur-
poses of this subsection, "public right-of-way" includes, but is not 
limited to, roads, streets, flood control channels, or other public 
transportation routes, and pipelines used as a conduit or sewage 
or other liquid for semiliquid discharges.83 
Under section 3(B), sewer system pipelines clearly fall within the 
Equity Act's exemption for municipalliability.84 Such an exemption 
effectively immunizes municipal sewer system authorities from liabil-
ity for contamination that originates from a public sewer system 
pipeline.85 Thus, as to municipal sewer system authorities, the Equity 
Act in its present form would foreclose CERCLA liability and settle 
the issue of liability for the hazardous discharges of industrial and 
commercial customers.86 
C. Public Sewer System Autlwrity Liability Loophole: CERCLA's 
Third Party Affirmative Defense 
Even if public sewer system authorities fall within a recognized 
PRP category, the issue of CERCLA liability remains unsettled, as 
states and municipalities may avoid liability through one of CER-
CLA's affirmative defenses.87 CERCLA recognizes three affirmative 
Envtl. Aff. L. Rev. 533, 562-ti6 (1993). Although Reardon's Comment analyzes the TCEAA 
instead of the Equity Act, the provisions in the two proposed amendments are similar and the 
analysis is therefore still helpful. 
81 See S. 965 § 3(C). 
82Id. at § 3(B). 
83Id. (emphasis added). 
84 Cf 42 U.S.C. § 9601(9)(A) (1988) (indicating that sewer system pipelines are "facilities" 
within CERCLA's scope of liability). 
85 See S. 965 § 3. 
86 See id. 
87 See infra notes 88-91 and accompanying text. 
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defenses to liability.88 A PRP may avoid liability if the PRP can establish 
that the release or threatened release was caused solely by an "act of 
God," an "act of war," or an "act or omission of a third party."89 The 
three enumerated exceptions to liability are the only substantive 
defenses expressly available to PRPS.90 The defenses are construed 
narrowly by courts to prevent the circumvention of CERCLA's broad 
remedial purpose.91 
A public sewer system authority could attempt to invoke the third 
party affirmative defense to avoid liability for the discharges of its 
industrial and commercial customers.92 In order to invoke CERCLA's 
third party defense successfully, a public sewer system authority 
must establish that (1) a third party was the sole cause of the release;93 
(2) the third party was not an employee or an agent of the authority; 
(3) the acts or omissions of the third party did not occur in connection 
with a direct or indirect contractual relationship with the authority; 
(4) the authority exercised due care with respect to the hazardous 
substances; and (5) the authority took precautions against the fore-
seeable acts and omissions of third parties.94 Each element must be 
established by a preponderance of the evidence.95 
8il42 u.s.c. § 9607(b) (1988). 
89 [d. CERCLA provides: 
[d. 
There shall be no liability under subsection (a) of this section for a person otherwise 
liable who can establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the release or threat 
of release of a hazardous substance and the damages resulting therefrom were caused 
solely by-(l) an act of God; (2) an act of war; (3) an act or omission of a third party 
other than an employee or agent of the defendant, or than one whose act or omission 
occurs in connection with a contractual relationship, existing directly or indirectly, with 
the defendant (except where the sole contractual arrangement arises from a published 
tariff and acceptance for carriage by a common carrier by rail) .... 
90 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (1988) states that response cost liability is "subject only to the defenses 
set forth in subsection (b) of this section .... " See, e.g., General Elec. Co. v. Litton Indus. 
Automation Sys., Inc., 920 F.2d 1415, 1418 (8th Cir. 1990), eert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 1390 (1991); 
United States v. Marisol, Inc., 725 F. Supp. 833, 838 (M.D. Pa. 1989). 
91 See United States v. Argent Corp., 21 Envtl. Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1354, 1356 (D.N.M. 1984) 
(noting that defenses enumerated in § 9607(b) are "extremely limited"). 
92 See infra notes 145--59 and accompanying text. 
9:1 The party who asserts the defense must affirmatively prove the absence of causation. 
United States v. Monsanto Co., 858 F.2d 160, 168 (4th Cir.) (42 U.S.C § 9607(b)(3) "sets forth a 
limited affirmative defense based on the complete absence of causation"), eert. denied, 490 U.S. 
1106 (1988). 
94 42 U.S.C. § 9607(b)(3) (1988); see Lincoln Properties, Ltd. v. Higgins, 823 F. Supp. 1528, 
1539-40 (E.D. Cal. 1992); Kelly v. Thomas Solvent Co., 714 F. Supp. 1439, 1446 (W.D. Mich. 1989). 
Public sewer system authorities will generally satisfy the latter four elements of the third party 
affirmative defense. See infra notes 147--59 and accompanying text. 
95 42 U.S.C. § 9607(b) (1988); see Lincoln Properties, Ltd. v. Higgins, 823 F. Supp. 1528, 1540 
(E.D. Cal. 1992) 
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Of the elements necessary for successful invocation of the third 
party affirmative defense, the first element presents the clearest 
application problem.96 Although a third party must be the sole cause 
of the release, the appropriate causation standard to apply is unclear.97 
The causation standard, however, is crucial in the determination of 
whether and how public sewer system authorities may avoid CER-
CLA liability.98 
Neither CERCLA's plain language nor its legislative history pro-
vide much assistance in defining the appropriate causation standard.99 
Case law that addresses the proper interpretation of "caused solely 
by" is relatively undeveloped.1Oo Some courts, however, have attempted 
to define the appropriate causation standard.1OI The District Court for 
the Northern District of California in Lincoln Properties, Ltd. v. 
96 See infra notes 153-59 and accompanying text. 
97 See infra notes 114-18 and accompanying text. 
98 See infra notes 153-59 and accompanying text. 
99 Section 9607(b) states that contamination must be "caused solely by" one of the enumerated 
defenses. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(b) (1988). CERCLA's legislative history provides general guidelines 
as to the meaning of the phrase "caused solely by:" 
The Committee intends that the usual common law principles of causation, including 
those of proximate causation, should govern the determination of whether a defendant 
"caused or contributed" to a release or threatened release. Whether a person caused 
or contributed to a release is a factual inquiry to be determined with reference to the 
particular circumstances of the case. Thus, for instance, the mere act of generation or 
transportation of hazardous waste, or the mere existence of a generator's or trans-
porter's waste in a site with respect to which cleanup [sic] costs are incurred would 
not, in and of itself, result in liability under section [9607(a)]. The Committee intends 
that for liability to attach under this section, the plaintiff must demonstrate a causal 
or contributory nexus between the acts of the defendant and the conditions which 
necessitated response action .... 
. . . In order to successfully interpose a listed defense, the defendant must demon-
strate causation in accordance with the principles described above .... 
With respect to the third party defense, a defendant is also required to establish that 
he exercise due care with respect to the hazardous waste concerned, taking into 
consideration the characteristics of such waste. The defendant must show that he 
exercised due care with respect to all reasonably foreseeable acts or omissions of a 
third party .... In general, the Committee intends that for a defendant to establish 
that he exercised due care, the defendant must demonstrate that he took all precau-
tions with respect to the particular waste that a similarly situated reasonable and 
prudent person would have taken in light of all relevant facts and circumstances. 
H.R. REP. No. 1016, 96th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1, at 33-34 (1980), reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
6119, 6136-37. 
The EPA has not promulgated any regulations that interpret the third party defense's 
"caused solely by" requirement and has not otherwise provided any guidance as to the standard 
to be applied to the requirement. 
100 See infra notes 114-18 and accompanying text. 
101 See infra notes 114-25 and accompanying text. 
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HigginslO2 directly addressed the issue of the proper causation stand-
ard to apply to the third party affirmative defenseYl3 After the court 
determined that a proximate cause standard was the appropriate 
standard,l04 the court used the standard to hold that a municipality 
was not liable under CERCLA for industrial discharges that leaked 
from a municipally-owned sewer system.105 
Although the facts of Lincoln Properties are set out in greater 
detail in the next section,l06 it is necessary to provide a brief overview 
of the facts of the case. The owners of a shopping center were sued 
for clean-up costs of the contamination of several of the shopping 
center's tenants.107 The tenants discharged hazardous substances into 
a sewer system. lOB The hazardous substances later leaked onto sur-
rounding property.109 The shopping center owners attempted to obtain 
response costs from the municipality that owned a portion of sewer 
system where hazardous substances leaked.110 The municipality sought 
to invoke CERCLA's third party affirmative defense, claiming in part 
that the hazardous waste contamination was caused solely by the 
tenants who discharged the hazardous substances.111 In determining 
the appropriate meaning of the affirmative defense's "caused solely 
by" requirement, the court looked for guidance to a similar provision 
in the CWA 112 and case law that interpreted the provision.113 
102 823 F. Supp. 1528 (E.D. Cal. 1992). 
103 [d. at 1540-42. 
104 [d. at 1542. 
105 [d. 
106 See discussion infra part lILA. 
107 See Lincoln Properties, 823 F. Supp. at 1532. 
108 See id. 
109 [d. 
110 [d. 
111 [d. at 1539. 
112 The court used 33 U.S.C. § 1321(f)(1)-(3) for comparison. See id. at 1541-42. Section 
1321(f)(1)-(3) states, in relevant part: 
Except where an owner or operator [of a vessel or onshore or offshore facilityl can 
prove that a discharge was caused solely by (A) an act of God, (B) an act of war, (C) 
negligence on the part of the United States Government, or (D) an act or omission of 
a third party without regard to whether any such act or omission was or was not 
negligent, or any combination of the foregoing clauses, such owner or operator . . . 
[shall be liable for costs incurred by the government in removing the hazardous 
substance or oill. 
33 U.S.C. § 1321(f)(1)-(3) (1988). 
CERCLA specifically provides that the CWA is to be used to determine the appropriate 
measure of liability. Under CERCLA, "[tlhe terms ... 'liable' or 'liability' shall be construed to 
be the standard of liability which obtains under section 1321 of [the CWAl." 42 U.S.C. § 9601(32) 
(1988). 
113 Lincoln Properties, Ltd. v. Higgins, 823 F. Supp. 1528, 1541-42 (E.D. Cal. 1992). 
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The Lincoln Properties court identified three possible construc-
tions for CERCLA's "caused solely by" affirmative defense require-
ment.n4 The first possible construction created a fault-based standard 
whereby any fault on the part of the PRP claiming the defense would 
violate the "caused solely by" requirement.l15 The second possible 
construction created a standard whereby the requirement would be 
violated when a claimant's negligent omissions or affirmative conduct 
causes contamination.1l6 Although not every affirmative act would 
vitiate the requirement, a claimant would be able to invoke the de-
fense successfully only if the act is "'indirect and insubstantia1' in the 
114 I d. at 1541-42. 
115Id. at 1541. The court relied on United States v. Bear Marine Services, 509 F. Supp. 710 
(E.D. La. 1980), for support of the first construction. Id. In Bear Marine, the District Court for 
the Eastern District of Louisiana concluded that fault would preclude successful invocation of 
the third party affirmative defense under the CWA. 509 F. Supp. at 715. The Bear Marine court 
stated that "[t]he legislative history makes it clear that the exceptions [under the CWA] are to 
be strictly construed and that they must, in fact, be sole causes of the discharge." Id. (emphasis 
in original). The Bear Marine court emphasized that "[t]he discharger must be totally free of 
fault; any fault on the part of the discharger vitiates the 'sole cause' exceptions." Id.; accord 
Grundy Oil Co. v. United States, 28 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1118, 1119 (Cl. Ct. 1988) ("any error 
on the part of the [claimant] that contribute[s] to the cause of the accident would preclude 
recovery"). 
116 Lincoln Properties, 823 F. Supp. at 1541-42. The Court of Claims' decision in Reliance 
Insurance Co. v. United States, 677 F.2d 844 (Ct. Cl. 1982), was relied upon for support of the 
second construction. Id. Although the Reliance court did not analyze 33 U.S.C. § 1321(t)(1)-{3), 
the court did analyze the "caused solely by" language as found in another provision of the CWA. 
677 F.2d at 847; see 33 U.S.C. § 1321(i) (1988 & Supp. IV 1992). The court first construed the 
"caused solely by" requirement in relation to a claimant's omissions. The court concluded that 
"[a]bsent a legal duty to act, a pre-existing, passive condition cannot be fairly held an omission 
for causative purposes." Reliance, 677 F.2d at 848. The court then proceeded to discuss the 
affects of a claimant's affirmative conduct on the "caused solely by" requirement and concluded 
that affirmative conduct by a claimant would violate the requirement unless the conduct was 
sufficiently indirect or insubstantial to the occurrence of a spill: 
It is implicit in this limitation that the conduct of the owner or operator cannot be a 
contributing cause of the spill. Thus, correlative to any inquiry into whether a spill was 
caused solely by a third party is an evaluation of the owner's or operator's own conduct. 
Where the act or omission of an owner or operator is a necessary antecedent to the 
spill, it is a contributing cause which bars recovery .... 
. . . Only in those instances which Congress believed to be completely beyond the 
control of the owner or operator would they be excused from liability. Any conduct, 
however slight, on the part of an owner or operator contributing to a spill would negate 
relief, even though such conduct might have operated in concert with greater third-
party conduct to produce the spill. In other words, only where the owner's or operator's 
conduct was so indirect and insubstantial as to displace him as a causative element of 
the discharge would he be relieved of responsibility and, correspondingly, financial 
liability. 
Id. at 84~9 (citations and footnotes omitted); see Kyoei Kaiun Kaisha, Ltd. v. MN Bering 
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chain of events leading to the release."l17 The third possible construc-
tion created a standard whereby the requirement would be violated 
by a claimant whose conduct is a proximate cause of the release or 
threatened release.n8 
After analyzing the three possible constructions in the context of 
CERCLA's third party affirmative defense, the court held that the 
term "caused solely by" in the defense incorporated the third con-
struction-a proximate cause standard.119 The court concluded that a 
fault-based construction was inconsistent with the third party affir-
mative defense's due care provisions.12o A construction that differen-
tiated between acts and omissions was also inconsistent with the third 
party affirmative defense because the defense's provisions made no 
such distinction between acts and omissions.121 In contrast, the court 
found that a proximate cause standard was consistent with the overall 
structure and language of the third party affirmative defense.l22 The 
court also determined that a proximate cause standard provided the 
Trader, 795 F. Supp. 1054, 1056 (W.D. Wash. 1991) ("Congress intended ... to make owners or 
operators liable if their actions contributed in any way to an accident .... ") (emphasis added). 
117 Lincoln Properties, 823 F. Supp. at 1542 (quoting Reliance, 677 F.2d at 849). 
118Id. The decision of the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in United States v. West of 
England Ship Oumer's Mutual Protection & Indemnity Association, 872 F.2d 1192 (5th Cir. 
1989), was relied upon for support of the third construction. Id. The West of England court relied 
on the CWA:.s statutory language and legislative history to conclude that causation and not fault 
is the focus of the third party affirmative defenses. 872 F.2d at 1196-97. The court then concluded 
that a spill is not "caused solely by" a third party if the claimant's acts or omissions constitute 
a proximate cause ofthe spill. Id. at 1198; see Union Petroleum Corp. v. United States, 651 F.2d 
734,745 (Ct. Cl. 1981) (spill "caused solely by" third parties where conduct of criminal intruders 
caused spill and claimant took reasonable steps to prevent third party conduct); Chicago, 
Milwaukee, St. Paul & Pacific R.R. v. United States, 575 F.2d 839, 841 (Ct. Cl. 1978) (same). 
119 Lincoln Properties, Ltd. v. Higgins, 823 F. Supp. 1528, 1542 (E.D. Cal. 1992). The court 
explained: 
[Tlhe court holds that "caused solely by," as used in CERCLA, incorporates the 
concept of proximate or legal cause. If the defendant's release was not foreseeable, and 
if its conduct-including acts as well as omissions-was "so indirect and insubstantial" 
in the chain of events leading to the release, then the defendant's conduct was not the 
proximate cause of the release and the third party defense may be available. This 
interpretation seems most consistent with the language of CERCLA:.s third party 
defense provision. It also has the advantage of providing a consistent interpretation of 
language now frequently used, without explanation, in the defense sections of various 
environmental statutes. 
Id.; accord United States v. Rohm and Haas Co., 790 F. Supp. 1255, 1264 (E.D. Pa. 1992) 
(contamination not caused solely by third party where defendant's trucks were used to transport 
wastes and trucks were cleaned and maintained at waste water pretreatment plant located on 
defendant's portion of site). 
120 Lincoln Properties, 823 F. Supp. at 1542. 
121Id. 
122Id. 
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strictest construction of the affirmative defense.123 Thus, a proximate 
cause standard would provide a viable exemption to liability without 
sacrificing CERCLA's broad remedial purpose.l24 Taking into account 
all of these factors, the court interpreted a proximate cause standard 
into the "caused solely by" requirement,I25 
III. JUDICIAL APPLICATION OF CERCLA LIABILITY TO PUBLIC 
SEWER SYSTEM AUTHORITIES 
Case law provides additional guidance into the proper application 
and scope of public sewer system liability under CERCLA. Two fed-
eral district courts have confronted the issue of public sewer system 
123 See id. 
124 See id. at 1540, 1542-43. CERCLA's legislative history endorses the application of proxi-
mate cause as a basis for causation: 
The Committee intends that the usual common law principles of causation, including 
those of proximate causation, should govern the determination of whether a defen-
dant "caused or contributed" to a release or threatened release .... 
. . . In order to successfully interpose a listed defense, the defendant must demon-
strate causation in accordance with the principles described above. 
H.R. REP. No. 1016, 96th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1, at 33-34 (1980), reprinted in U.S.C.C.A.N. 6119, 
6136-37 (emphasis added). 
In addition to its consistency with CERCLA's plain language and overall structure and its 
conformity with CERCLA's legislative history, a proximate cause standard for the "caused 
solely by" requirement, by allowing public sewer system authorities to avoid liability in appro-
priate circumstances, see infra notes 147-59 and accompanying text, would also advance impor-
tant policy considerations. See discussion infra part IV. 
1:?D Other courts have refused to adopt Lincoln Properties's proximate cause standard. For 
example, in Violet v. Picillo, the District Court for the District of Rhode Island without 
discussion expressly rejected the application of a proximate cause standard to 42 U.S.C. 
§ 9607(b)'s "caused solely by" requirement. 648 F. Supp. 1283, 1294 (D.R.!. 1986), later proceed-
ing sub nom. O'Neil v. Picillo, 682 F. Supp. 706 (D.R.I. 1988), aff'd, 883 F.2d 176 (1st Cir. 1989); 
accord United States v. Marisol, Inc., 725 F. Supp. 833, 838 (M.D. Pa. 1989) (defense insufficient 
where defendant claimed that contamination proximately caused by acts and omissions of third 
parties). However, the court in Violet provided little reasoning for its rejection of a proximate 
cause standard and did not attempt to determine a more appropriate standard. AI; the court 
concluded: 
[T]he doctrine of supervening, intervening cause describes an act of a third person or 
other force, which by its intervention, prevents the principal actor from being held 
liable to another, notwithstanding the principal's prior actions. Superseding, interven-
ing cause is a part of the general tort law principle of proximate causation. [Defen-
dant's] argument flows naturally from its view that liability under CERCLA requires 
proof of causation. However, the doctrine of proximate causation does not apply to 
CERCLA. 
648 F. Supp. at 1294 (citations omitted). Furthermore, the cases that the Violet court cited in 
support of its rejection of a proximate cause standard discussed causation in the context of 42 
U.S.C. § 9607(a) rather than § 9607(b). See id. 
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liability under CERCLA.I26 The two courts reached different conclu-
sions as to the imposition of CERCLA liability to public sewer system 
authorities.1Z7 The two courts, however, applied similar analyses to 
determine the parameters of public sewer system authority liability 
under CERCLA.I28 
A. The Lincoln Properties and Westfarm Associates Decisions 
Lincoln Properties, Ltd. v. Higgins I29 was the first case to address 
the issue of public sewer system liability under CERCLA.I30 The 
court held that, although a municipal sewer system authority owned 
a portion of sewer system that leaked hazardous substances, the 
municipality could invoke the third party affirmative defense and 
avoid CERCLA liability.I31 
Lincoln Properties, Ltd. (Lincoln) owned a shopping center on a 
thirty acre parcel of land in San Joaquin County, California (County).132 
Lincoln leased shopping center space to dry cleaners.I33 The dry clean-
ers used perchloroethylene (PCE),I34 a commercial cleaning solvent, 
in the course of their business.I35 Although a County ordinance pro-
hibited the discharge of cleaning solvents into the municipal sewer 
system,136 PCE was discharged into the sewer system.137 Discharged 
PCE eventually contaminated a County well and ground water and 
soil beneath the shopping center.I38 Lincoln conceded that it was liable 
in the first instance for CERCLA clean-up costs based on its owner-
ship of the shopping center.I39 Lincoln, however, sued the County for 
126Westfarm Assocs. L.P. v. International Fabricare Inst., No. HM-92-9, 1993 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 15921 (D. Md. July 16, 1993); Lincoln Properties, Ltd. v. Higgins, 823 F. Supp. 1528 (E.D. 
Cal. 1992). 
127 See discussion infra part lILA. 
128 See infra notes 183-85 and accompanying text. 
129 823 F. Supp. 1528 (E.D. Cal. 1992). 
130 [d. at 1533--35, 1538, 1542-44. 
131 [d. at 1542. 
132 [d. at 1532. 
133 [d. 
134 Perchloroethylene (PCE) is also known as ethene, tetrachloroethene, and tetrachlo-
roethylene. 40 C.F.R. § 302.4 (1993). PCE is a designated CERCLA "hazardous substance" 
under 40 C.F.R. § 302.4. [d.; see International Fabricare Inst. v. EPA, 972 F.2d 384, 395-98 (D.C. 
Cir. 1992) (discussing generally PCE and its dangers). 
135 Lincoln Properties, Ltd. V. Higgins, 823 F. Supp. 1528, 1532 (E.D. Cal. 1992). 
136 [d. at 1544. 
137 [d. at 1532. 
138 [d. 
139 [d. 
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contribution.140 Lincoln sought response costs from the County based 
on the County's alleged ownership of a portion of leaking sewer sys-
tem located underneath the shopping center and the County's undis-
puted ownership of several wells with cracked casings through which 
PCE might have escaped.141 
The County moved for summary judgment as to all of Lincoln's 
claims asserted against it.142 The court granted the County's motion 
for summary judgment.143 The court concluded that a trier of fact 
could infer that at least some PCE was released through leaks in the 
sewer system owned by the County and that the County could thus 
be liable for such releases.144 The court, however, found that CER-
CLA's third party affirmative defense145 precluded liability for the 
release of PCE from the County's sewer system.146 
The court concluded that the County satisfied all of the require-
ments of CERCLA's third party affirmative defense.147 Noone con-
tested that the third parties involved-the dry cleaners-were not 
the County's agents or employees.148 The court found that no relevant 
contractual relationship existed between the County and the third 
parties.149 The court also pointed to several factors that led it to 
find that the County exercised due care and took reasonable precau-
tions.l50 The County tested and inspected joints in the sewer system 
and maintained the sewer system in accordance with industry stand-
ards. l5l The County also possessed an ordinance that prohibited the 
discharge of PCE and other cleaning solvents into the sewer sys-
tem.152 
The requirement that the release of PCE be "caused solely by" 
third parties posed the most significant obstacle to the court's appli-
cation of the affirmative defense.l53 Applying a proximate cause stand-
ard, however,l54 the court concluded that third parties solely caused 
140 [d. 
141 [d. 
142 [d. 
143 [d. at 1544. 
144 [d. at 1538-539. 
145 42 U.S.C. § 9607(b). See supra notes 93-95 and accompanying text. 
146 Lincoln Properties, Ltd. v. Higgins, 823 F. Supp. 1528, 1544 (E.D. Cal. 1992). 
147 [d. at 1540-44. 
148 [d. at 1540. 
149 [d. at 1543. 
150 [d. at 1543-44. 
151 [d. at 1544. 
152 [d. 
153 See id. at 1540-43. 
154 See supra note 118. 
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the PCE contamination.155 There existed no evidence that the County 
engaged in conduct that contributed to the release of PCE aside from 
the County's mere ownership of the sewer system.156 Although dry 
cleaners discharged PCE into the County's sewer system, the dry 
cleaners' conduct violated a specific municipal ordinance and thus was 
unforeseeable to the County.157 The County also took reasonable pre-
cautions to prevent foreseeable releases of hazardous waste.l58 Under 
such circumstances, the court concluded that the County's conduct 
was indirect and insubstantial to the PCE contamination.l59 Thus, the 
County's acts and omissions did not proximately cause the contami-
nation and the County satisfied the "caused solely by" requirement of 
CERCLA's third party affirmative defense. 
The subject of public sewer system liability under CERCLA was 
also addressed, with different results, by the District Court for the 
District of Maryland in Wesifarm Associates L.P. v. International 
Fabricare Institute.1OO The court held that a state-established sewer 
system authority was liable under CERCLA for contamination caused 
by its leaking sewers and that the authority could not invoke the third 
party affirmative defense because the release of hazardous substances 
was not caused solely by third parties.161 Mter discovering the pres-
ence of PCE in ground water under its property, Westfarm Associ-
ates, L.P. (Westfarm) brought action against International Fabricare 
Institute (Fabricare).Hl2 Fabricare occupied land adjacent to West-
farm's property and used PCE in several of the dry cleaning and 
related operations conducted on its premises.l63 Fabricare disposed of 
PCE into the public sewer system from 1969 until 1992.164 PCE es-
caped from public sewer pipes into surrounding property.165 Westfarm 
and Fabricare subsequently asserted claims under CERCLA against 
the Washington Suburban Sanitary Commission (WSSC).166 
The WSSC, a state agency that provides water and sewage services 
to the residents of two Maryland counties, owned the sewer system 
155 Lincoln Properties, Ltd. v. Higgins, 823 F. Supp. 1528, 1542 (E.D. Cal. 1992). 
156 [d. at 1542-43. 
157 See id. 
158 See id. at 1543-44. 
159 See id. at 1542-43. 
160 No. HM-92-9, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15921 (D. Md. July 16,1993). 
161 [d. at *24-25. 
162 [d. at *1. 
163 [d. at *1, *2. 
164 [d. at *2..,'3. 
165 [d. at *16 & n.7. 
166 [d. at *6. 
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into which Fabricare disposed PCE.167 The sewer system fell into 
disrepair and many sewer pipes were cracked.168 Although the court 
concluded that the WSSC was on constructive notice that its sewer 
system contained cracks, the WSSC neglected to repair the sewer 
system.169 Since 1918 the WSSC prohibited discharges of "any noxious 
or malodorous ... substance ... capable of creating a public nuisance 
or hazard to life .... "170 Only beginning in 1983, however, did the 
WSSC impose limits on the discharge of "toxic organics" into the 
sewer.l7l The WSSC's regulations also allowed discharges of other 
hazardous substances into the sewer system.l72 
The court in Westfarm Associates granted Westfarm's motion for 
summary judgment and held that the WSSC could be liable for CER-
CLA response costs for the cleanup of PCE released from its sewer 
system.173 The court also held that the WSSC could not invoke CER-
CLA's third party affirmative defense.174 The WSSC failed to satisfy 
the affirmative defense's requirements that it exercise due care and 
take reasonable precautions against third parties' foreseeable acts 
and omissions and that third parties solely cause the contamination.175 
Several factors combined to influence the court to decide that the 
WSSC satisfied none of the three requirements.176 The WSSC de-
signed the sewer to leak and neglected to repair cracked sewer pipes.l77 
The WSSC also expected customers such as Fabricare to pour haz-
ardous substances into the sewer; and its regulations-up until 1983-
allowed discharges of hazardous substances such as PCE into the 
sewer system.178 Such conduct, the court concluded, caused the release 
167 [d. at *3-4. 
168 [d. at *4. 
169 [d. at *24, *37. 
170 [d. at *3, *5. The WSSC amended its regulations in 1992 to prohibit discharges of "mal-
odorous or toxic ... substances that ... are capable of creating a public nuisance or hazard to 
human health or the environment . ... " [d. at * 5 (emphasis added). The amended regulations, 
by extending prohibitions to discharges that threaten human health or the environment, pro-
vided a broader prohibition than the earlier regulations. 
171 [d. at *5. 
172 See id. at *24. The WSSC designed its sewer to allow pipe leakage at a rate of 200 gallons 
per inch diameter, per mile, per day. [d. at *4. Although the court noted this fact, the designed 
leakage was not determinative of the court's decision. Rather, the WSSC's conduct, and not the 
sewer system's overall design, constituted the focus of the court's holding. See infra notes 175-78 
and accompanying text. 
173 See Westfarm Assocs., 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15921, at *20-21. 
174 [d. at *41. 
175 [d. at *25 & n.B. 
176 See id. at *24-25. 
177 [d. at *25. 
178 [d. 
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of hazardous substances and vitiated the third party affirmative de-
fense. 179 
B. Reconciling the Lincoln Properties and Westfarm Associates 
Decisions 
Lincoln Properties and Westjarm Associates are similar in several 
respects. In both cases, third parties sued public sewer system authori-
ties for contribution of CERCLA response costS.180 Both public sewer 
system authorities attempted to avoid liability through the use of 
CERCLA's third party affirmative defense.18l Only the public sewer 
system authority in Lincoln Properties, however, was successful in 
its invocation of the defense.l82 
The courts in Lincoln Properties and Westjarm Associates applied 
the same analysis to the issue of public sewer system liability. Both 
courts concluded that sewer systems are CERCLA "facilities."l83 Both 
courts also concluded that public sewer system authorities may be 
PRPs under CERCLA as "owners" of sewer systems.l84 The courts, 
however, reached divergent conclusions on the issue of the applicabil-
ity of CERCLA's third party affirmative defense.185 This disagree-
ment, however, may be properly considered the result of differing 
factual circumstances in the two cases. 
The facts of Lincoln Properties supported the application of CER-
CLA's third party affirmative defense.186 The County's commercial 
sewer customers were the sole cause of the contamination. No County 
conduct contributed to the release of hazardous substances.l87 The 
County also exercised due care and took reasonable precautions against 
the foreseeable acts and omissions of its commercial customers.l88 The 
County built and maintained sewer lines in accordance with industry 
179 See id. at *24-25. 
180 [d. at *6; Lincoln Properties, Ltd. v. Higgins, 823 F. Supp. 1528, 1532 (E.D. Cal. 1992). 
181 Westfarm Assocs. L.P. v. International Fabricare Inst., No. HM-92-9, 1993 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 15921, at *23 (D. Md. July 16, 1993); Lincoln Properties, 823 F. Supp. at 1539. 
182 Wesifarm Assocs., 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15921, at *25; Lincoln Properties, 823 F. Supp. 
at 1544. 
183 See Westfarm Assocs., 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15921, at *11-12; Lincoln Properties, 823 F. 
Supp. at 1538. 
184 See Westfarm Assocs., 1993 U.S. Dist LEXIS 15921, at *4, *20-21, Lincoln Properties, 823 
F. Supp. at 1538. 
185 Westfarm Assocs., 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15921, at *25, Lincoln Properties, 823 F. Supp. 
at 1543. 
186 See Lincoln Properties, Ltd. v. Higgins, 823 F. Supp. 1528, 1542-44 (E.D. Cal. 1992). 
187 [d. at 1542. 
188 See id. at 1542-44. 
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standards and promulgated an ordinance that prohibited the dis-
charge of PCE and other cleaning solvents into the sewer system.189 
The County also could not be expected to foresee that its ordinance 
prohibiting the discharge of hazardous substances would be violated.1OO 
Under such circumstances, the County's conduct was indirect and 
insubstantial to the release of PCE and the County thus met the 
"caused solely by" third parties requirement.191 
In contrast, the WSSC failed to exercise due care and take reason-
able precautions against the foreseeable acts and omissions of third 
partiesY12 The WSSC's conduct also proximately caused contamina-
tion. The WSSC designed its sewer system to leak and failed to 
upkeep its sewer lines properly even when it was on notice that 
portions of its sewer line needed repairy13 Although the WSSC pos-
sessed an ordinance that regulated discharges into the sewer system, 
the court found that the ordinance provided insufficient protection 
against hazardous discharges.194 Finally, a WSSC representative ad-
mitted that the WSSC foresaw that some of its industrial customers 
would release hazardous substances into the sewer system.195 Far 
from exercising due care and taking reasonable precautions, the WSSC 
permitted the discharge of potentially hazardous waste into its im-
properly maintained sewer system.196 Furthermore, the WSSC, unlike 
the County in Lincoln Properties,lffl through its conduct directly con-
tributed to the release of hazardous substances.198 Because the WSSC's 
conduct proximately caused the PCE contamination, the WSSC failed 
to satisfy the "caused solely by" requirement of CERCLA's third 
party affirmative defense. 
In sum, the decisions in Lincoln Properties and Westfarm Associ-
ates both addressed the issue of public sewer system authority liabil-
ity under CERCLA. The two cases, however, contain significant fac-
tual differences. The different factual circumstances surrounding each 
case, in turn, helps to explain why CERCLA's third party affirmative 
100 [d. at 1544. 
190 [d. at 1543 n.25. 
191 [d. at 1543. 
192 See Westfarm Assocs. L.P. v. International Fabricare Inst., No. HM-92-9, 1993 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 15921, at *24-25 (D. Md. July 16, 1993). 
100 [d. at *24. 
191 See id. 
195 [d. 
196 See id. 
Hn See supra notes 187-90 and accompanying text. 
HE See supra notes 193-95 and accompanying text. 
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defense was appropriate in Lincoln Properties and inappropriate in 
Westfarrn Associates. 
IV. CERCLA LIABILITY AND PUBLIC SEWER SYSTEM 
AUTHORITIES: POLICY ARGUMENTS 
Several considerations caution against the application of CERCLA 
liability to public sewer system authorities for the discharges of their 
industrial and commercial customers absent direct responsibility for 
contamination. Such arguments are by no means determinative on the 
matter of public sewer system liability under CERCLA. They are, 
however, significant factors that a court should consider when deter-
mining whether or not to impose liability on a public sewer system 
authority.l99 
One policy consideration that favors a public sewer system author-
ity liability shield is the cost of CERCLA liability to states and munici-
palities.200 CERCLA would expose public sewer system authorities to 
enormous liability for the cleanup of hazardous waste contamina-
tion.201 If public sewer system authorities challenge the imposition of 
liability they must litigate the issue. Such litigation, and the transac-
tion costs associated with litigation, is expensive and often lasts for 
years.202 
The threat of exposure to CERCLA liability may also compel public 
sewer system authorities to expend limited resources to design and 
install preventative measures and implement additional oversight 
199 Such policy arguments may also be considered by a court in apportioning liability if the 
court holds a particular public sewer system authority liable under CERCLA. See 42 U.S.C. 
§ 9613(0(1) (1988) (courts may consider equitable factors when assessing the proper proportion 
of liability as between several liable parties). 
200 See, e.g., Schmidt, supra note 21, at 2. 
201 See supra note 16 and accompanying text. The cost of liability is of greater concern to 
municipalities, because their resources and their revenue generating capabilities are far less 
than that of states. 
202 See Lynnette Boomgaarden & Charles Breer, Surveying the Superfund Settlement Di-
lemma, 27 LAND & WATER L. REV. 83, 91 (1992) (stating that full-blown litigation often takes 
years to complete and can amount to $200-300,000 every six months for small groups of 
mid-volume to de minimis PRPs); Kit R. Krickenberger & Pamela Rekar, Superfund Settle-
ments: Breaking the Logjam, [19 Current Developments] Env't Rep. (BNA) 2384, 2386 (Mar. 
10, 1989) (noting one CERCLA suit for response costs in which parties spent $2.5 million in 
overall litigation costs); see also Frank Viviano, Superfund Costs May Top S & L Bailout: U.S. 
Toxies Cleanup Mired in Lawsuits, S.F. CHRON., May 29, 1991, at Al (noting that, to date, eight 
billion dollars has been spent towards the cleanup of CERCLA sites while $12 billion has been 
spent in CERCLA transaction and litigation costs). "Transaction costs" entail interest costs, 
search costs for the identification of other PRPs, and other associated CERCLA clean-up costs. 
Transaction costs increase substantially when the number of PRPs increase. ACTON & DIXON, 
supra note 16, at 51. 
118 ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS [Vol. 22:89 
procedures to prevent future liability. The impetus to implement pre-
ventative measures would be great because of the difficulty in obtain-
ing insurance for environmentalliability.203 The expense of preventa-
tive measures, however, is prohibitive. The cost of determining the 
presence of hazardous substances alone is often overwhelming to 
states and municipalities.204 
The costs of CERCLA liability and liability prevention lead to a 
misallocation of state and municipal resources. Some state and mu-
nicipal financial resources are limited by constitutional or statutory 
constraints.205 Expending limited resources to defend against, payoff, 
and prevent CERCLA liability may result in the neglect or abandon-
ment of other government functions and threatens the ability of states 
and municipalities to carry out such functions.206 
200 See Kenneth S. Abraham, Enviranmental Liability and the Limits of Insurance, 88 Co-
LUM. L. REV. 942, 944 (1988). 
204 See Steven Semeraro, 7bward an Optimal System of Successor Liability for Hazardous 
Waste Cleanup, 6 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 226, 264 (1986--87); see also United States v. South Carolina 
Recycling and Disposal, Inc., 653 F. Supp. 984, 993 n.6 (D.S.C. 1984) (noting that it would cost 
about $2.5 million to attempt through analytical means to identify all of the hazardous sub-
stances located at the contaminated facility, a cost approximately five times the cost of the 
removal of hazardous substances from the facility), aff'd in part, vacated in part sub nom. 
United States v. Monsanto Co., 858 F.2d 160 (4th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1106 (1989). 
2(X; See, e.g., Eugene Berman & Jeffrey H. Howard, How Should Federal Hazardous Waste 
Policy Address Potentially Respansible Local Governments?, [19 Current Developments] 
Envt'l Rep. (BNA) 373,376 (July 15, 1988). 
Adding to the difficulties facing states and municipalities is the fact that last year the Clinton 
Administration reduced federal funding for state and municipal sewage treatment by $720 
million. Gregory Gordon, U.S. Budget Slashes Fundsfor Treatment of Sewage, STAR THIB., Aug. 
16, 1993, at 1A. 
206 See Keith Schneider, Industries and Towns Clash About Who Pays to Get Rid of Poisons, 
N.Y. TIMES, July 18, 1991, at A14 (reporting that a town in California with a $55 million annual 
budget could be liable for $20 to $30 million in CERCLA costs over a decade and that a town 
in Connecticut with a $1.6 million annual budget could face up to one million dollars in CERCLA 
liability). 
The following testimony before a Senate subcommittee by a member of the city council of 
Alhambra, California illustrates the tough choices that municipalities face: 
Local governments, small businesses, and others find themselves in a horrific "Catch 
22" when they receive notice of [CERCLA] lawsuits. If they cannot afford, or do not 
think it is right, to settle such claims, they must spend millions to defend themselves 
and pray that somewhere down the line a judge will put an end to this madness. The 
price paid in the interim is extreme .... [O]ne of the cities in our group-Bell, Califor-
nia-had no alternative but to layoff two policemen in order to meet its share of our 
joint defense costs, and I am certain that these normally hidden, but devastating, social 
costs are being duplicated in targeted communities throughout the country. 
Superfund Issues Facing Municipalities: Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Superfund, 
Ocean and Water Protection of the Senate Committee an Enviranment and Public Works, 102d 
Cong., 1st Sess. 84 (July 29, 1991) (prepared statement of Boyd C. Condie, Council Member, 
Alhambra, California). 
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Imposing CERCLA contribution costs on public sewer system authori-
ties is also an unfair method of allocating costs for the cleanup of 
contaminated sites. States and municipalities would pass CERCLA 
costs on to the general public in the form of higher taxes or usage 
rates.207 Such increased costs would produce no resulting public benefit.208 
In addition, ratepayers are already finding that it is increasingly 
difficult to afford sewer services.209 
Industrial and commercial dischargers would be able to more fairly 
allocate clean-up costs by passing off such costs to customers and 
purchasers. Clean-up costs are then made part of the expense in-
volved in making the product or providing the service and will reflect 
the true social cost of the product or service.210 Such an allocation 
would pass on costs to the parties who benefit from a particular 
service or product, rather than have the public subsidize the cleanup. 
Under a "cost spreading" approach to liability, public sewer system 
authorities may appear to be desirable targets for CERCLA liability. 
Public sewer system authorities may be better able to spread the 
costs of CERCLA liability among the general public.211 The fact that 
207 For example, in United States v. Montrose Chem. Corp., discussed supra note 21, the public 
sewer system authorities that agreed to pay CERCLA response costs planned to obtain the 
revenue for such costs from user fees. See Johannessen, supra note 21, at 327. Public sewer 
system authorities could attempt to raise user fees only for industrial and commercial custom-
ers. Although the imposition of increased fees on industrial and commercial customers may be 
more equitable than the imposition of increased fees on all customers, the fee suffers from the 
same inherent unfairness as a general tax or rate increase because not all industrial and 
commercial customers discharge hazardous substances into sewer systems. Imposing increased 
fees on all industrial and commercial customers, regardless of their conduct, is also contrary to 
CERCLA's purpose of holding those responsible for contamination responsible for cleanup. See 
infra note 217. 
208 Compare this situation with the situation presented in B.F. Goodrich Co. v. Murtha. 958 
F.2d 1192 (2d Cir. 1992). The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in B.F. Goodrich held that 
a municipality could be found liable for CERCLA clean-up costs for its role in arranging for the 
disposal of MSW. Id. at 1198. The court rejected the policy argument that the imposition of 
CERCLA liability on municipalities for transporting and arranging for disposal of MSW would 
result in shouldering the burden of response costs on municipal taxpayers with no resulting 
benefit. Id. at 1204. Unlike the situation with the disposal of industrial and commercial sewer 
waste, however, municipal taxpayers obtain direct, although slight, benefits from the disposal 
of MSW. See id. (municipal taxpayers benefit from the disposal of hazardous household sub-
stances). 
209 Residential users in many sewer districts find it difficult to afford sewer system authorities' 
rapidly rising service rates. See Scott Allen, Cost of Clean Water is Hot Political Issue, Hous. 
CHRON., July 4, 1993, at C7; see also Andy Dabilis, Water Rates Too High for Many PerYple to 
Pay, BOSTON GLOBE, Jan. 12, 1992, at 1 (Northwest Weekly). 
210 See generally Developments in the Law-Toxic Waste Litigation, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1548, 
1612-14 (1986). 
211 Taken to its logical extreme, the cost spreading approach to liability would favor a national 
tax as the proper means to pay for CERCLA, as the best way to spread costs would be on a 
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public sewer system authorities may be able to more effectively spread 
costs, however, does not mean that they should be held liable under 
CERCLA. Spreading CERCLA costs among the general public would 
be unfair because the public would be subsidizing industrial and com-
mercial establishments and their customers for the social costs of 
their goods and services. In addition, the imposition of a general tax 
is inconsistent with Congressional intent. A cost spreading approach 
would amount to a CERCLA "tax" on the general pUblic. However, 
Congress explicitly rejected the idea of a general tax when it created 
CERCLA.212 Thus, although public sewer system authorities may be 
better able to spread clean-up costs than their industrial or commer-
cial customers, such an approach is unfair and, more importantly, 
contrary to Congressional intent. 
CERCLA's underlying purposes also counsel against the imposition 
of liability on public sewer system authorities. CERCLA possesses 
two essential purposes: the promotion of the prompt and effective 
cleanup of hazardous waste sites and the imposition of liability on 
those responsible for hazardous waste contamination.213 Extending 
CERCLA liability to public sewer system authorities, however, pro-
motes neither purpose. The extension of CERCLA liability to public 
sewer system authorities would promote time consuming litigation 
and delay action to clean up contaminated facilities.214 Furthermore, 
the true responsible parties, absent circumstances such as were evi-
national, rather than municipal or state, scale. A national tax would most effectively spread 
costs and would also have the advantage of access to greater resources. 
212 Smith Land & Improvement Corp. v. Celotex Corp., 851 F.2d 86, 92 (3d Cir. 1988), cert. 
denied, 488 U.S. 1029 (1989). As the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit explained: 
Expenses can be borne by two sources: the entities which had a specific role in the 
production ... of the hazardous condition, or the taxpayers through federal funds. 
CERCLA leaves no doubt that Congress intended the burden to fall on the latter only 
when the responsible parties lacked the wherewithal to meet their obligations. 
Id.; see In re Bell Petroleum Servs., Inc., 3 F.3d 889, 897 (5th Cir. 1993) ("CERCLA is a strict 
liability statute, one of the purposes of which is to shift the cost of cleaning up environmental 
harm from the taxpayers to the parties who benefited from the disposal of the wastes that 
caused the harm"). 
However, the expenditure of public funds is necessary at sites where no private PRPs can be 
located or where private PRPs lack the financial resources necessary to effect a cleanup. See 
Smith Land & Imprauement, 851 F.2d at 92. Given this, private PRPs should be liable for as 
much of the cleanup of a contaminated facility as possible. A narrow construction of the third 
party affirmative defense prevents this because it allows private PRPs to decrease liability by 
obtaining response costs from public sewer system authorities through contribution actions 
when such contribution is wholly inappropriate. 
213 See, e.g., B.F. Goodrich Co. v. Murtha, 958 F.2d 1192, 1198 (2d Cir. 1992); Barmet Aluminum 
Corp. v. Reilly, 927 F.2d 289, 291 (6th Cir. 1991). 
214 See Municipalities Should Be Held Liable for Cleanup Only by EPA, Witnesses Say, [24 
Current Developments] Env't Rep. (BNA) 10 (May 7,1993) ("many industrial PRPs have been 
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dent in Westfarm Associates,215 would be industrial and commercial 
dischargers, not public authorities.216 Placing a portion of the economic 
burden for cleanup on states and municipalities would amount to 
public subsidization of contamination cleanup and would allow those 
who are truly responsible to shirk their responsibility. Such public 
subsidization of response costs thwarts Congressional intent to im-
pose liability on responsible parties.217 Rather, clean-up costs should 
be placed upon those responsible for the contamination and not the 
general public.218 
There exist several policy concerns that favor the exclusion of 
public sewer system authority liability under CERCLA. Fiscal and 
time concerns favor total immunity in order to protect state and 
municipalities from CERCLA's financial burdens and to promote the 
prompt cleanup of contaminated sites.219 These concerns, however, 
must be balanced with other policy considerations: fairness and con-
sistency with CERCLA's purpose of holding the parties responsible 
for contamination liable for clean-up costs.220 These other policy con-
cerns do not support total immunity because total immunity would 
allow public sewer system authorities to avoid liability even when 
they are responsible for hazardous waste contamination. The recon-
ciliation of these various policy concerns requires an approach to 
suing local governments as a delaying tactic, knowing that 'proving that they didn't put toxic 
wastes into garbage will take years and a lot of money"'). 
215 See supra notes 163-72 and accompanying text. 
216 See supra note 10 and accompanying text. 
217 See supra note 213. 
218 Unlike RCRA and the CWA, CERCLA is primarily remedial in nature. See United States 
v. Alcan Aluminum Corp., 964 F.2d 252, 258 (3d Cir. 1992); B.F. Goodrich Co. v. Murtha, 958 F.2d 
1192, 1198 (2d Cir. 1992). However, by imposing liability on responsible parties CERCLA 
attempts to affect future behavior and prevent future hazardous waste contamination. See Grad, 
supra note 51, at 2. The extension of liability to public sewer system authorities, however, does 
little to promote the future prevention of hazardous waste. Although public sewer system 
authorities can monitor sewer systems for hazardous waste discharges, states and municipalities 
lack adequate resources to be effectual monitors for the prevention of hazardous waste contami-
nation. See supra notes 203"'{)5 and accompanying text. More importantly, the focus of preven-
tion should be the dischargers of hazardous substances, not public sewer system authorities. 
Industrial and commercial customers, by exercising direct control over their discharges, are in 
the best position to control discharges. However, allowing industrial and commercial customers 
to decrease their CERCLA liability by suing public sewer system authorities for contribution 
provides less of an incentive for industrial and commercial customers to regulate their dis-
charges. Thus, although public sewer system authorities do possess monitoring capabilities, 
industrial and commercial customers make far more effective monitors. Public sewer system 
authority liability, however, may chill effective oversight by industrial and commercial dis-
chargers. 
219 See supra notes 200-02 and 205-06 and accompanying text. 
220 See supra notes 207-10 and 213-18 and accompanying text. 
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public sewer system liability that lies somewhere between absolute 
immunity and absolute liability. The proper approach is the use of 
CERCLA's third party affirmative defense and Lincoln Properties's 
proximate cause standard to the "caused solely by" third parties 
requirement. 
V. APPLICATION OF CERCLA LIABILITY TO PUBLIC SEWER 
SYSTEM AUTHORITIES 
Public sewer system authorities should not receive a blanket of 
immunity under CERCLA. Rather, courts should use Lincoln Prap-
erties's proximate cause approach to the "caused solely by" third 
parties requirement of CERCLA's third party affirmative defense.221 
Such an approach strikes a correct balance between liability and 
protection from liability under CERCLA.222 Applying Lincoln Prap-
erties's proximate cause standard, states and municipalities should be 
able to use the third party affirmative defense as a shield against 
CERCLA liability by taking appropriate steps in the construction, 
maintenance, and oversight of sewer systems.223 Given such protec-
tion for public sewer system authorities, the Equity Act, insofar as it 
deals with municipal sewer system authorities, is unnecessary and, in 
fact, inappropriate.224 
A. Steps Public Sewer System Authorities Should Take to 
Enhance the Likelihood of the Application of CERCLA's Third 
Party Affirmative Defense 
Because of CERCLA's high economic stakes,225 public sewer system 
authorities must take appropriate steps to avoid liability.226 Unless 
Congress revises CERCLA,227 public sewer system authorities cannot 
221 See supra notes 154--59 and accompanying text. 
222 See supra notes 186-98 and accompanying text. 
2ZJ See infra notes 233-44 and accompanying text. 
224 See discussion infra part V.B. 
225 See supra note 16. 
226 Industrial and commercial sewer system customers are taking steps to reduce the possi-
bility of hazardous waste contamination from sewers and thus reduce the chances of CERCLA 
liability. See, e.g., Mike Pulley, Dry Cleaners Gasp as Toxic Chemical Shows Up in Wells, Bus. 
J.-SAC~AMENTO, Sept. 23, 1991, at 1 (discussing industry attempts to persuade members to send 
wastewater to toxic recyclers rather than to dispose wastewater into sewer systems); Anne K. 
Rhodes, Technology, Efficient Operation Key Elements in Environmental Strategy, OIL & GAS 
J., Nov. 29, 1993, at 39 (discussing industry attempts to prevent hazardous waste contamination 
through use of concrete trenches for sewer pipes). 
2Z1 E.g., supra notes 71-74 and accompanying text. CERCLA is due to expire in 1994 and, at 
the date of publication, was in the process of obtaining congressional reauthorization. See 
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escape owner or operator status: the statute's plain language and 
relevant case law support the inclusion of public sewer system authori-
ties as owners and operatorsPS Liability, however, is not absolute. 
Public sewer system authorities may utilize CERCLA's third party 
affirmative defense as a shield against liability.229 The Lincoln Prop-
erties and Wesifarm Associates decisions provide useful examples of 
appropriate and inappropriate conduct, respectively, on the part of 
Hurdles Still Seenfor Reform Measures as Floor Action Nearsfor House Version, [25 Current 
Developments] Env't Rep. (BNA) 699 (Aug. 12, 1994) (noting that, although CERCLA reform 
legislation has passed major committees in both the House of Representatives and the Senate, 
"passage of the bill remains far from certain"). 
228 See discussions supra parts ILB.1 and IILB. 
229 See supra notes 145-59 and accompanying text. Even when a public sewer system author-
ity is found liable under CERCLA, the authority may attempt to minimize its liability by 
settling as a de minimis party if the government determines that the authority played only a 
minor role in the release of hazardous substances. CERCLA's de minimis provisions are set 
forth in 42 U.S.C. § 9622(g), which reads in relevant part: 
Whenever practicable and in the public interest, as determined by the President, the 
President shall as promptly as possible reach a final settlement with a potentially 
responsible party in an administrative or civil action under section 9606 or 9607 of this 
title if such settlement involves only a minor portion of the response costs at the facility 
concerned and, in the judgment of the President, the conditions in either of the 
following subparagraph (A) or (B) are met: (A) Both of the following are minimal in 
comparison to other hazardous substances at the facility: (i) The amount of the hazard-
ous substances contributed by that party to the facility. (ii) The toxic or other hazard-
ous effects of the substances contributed by that party to the facility. (B) The poten-
tially responsible party-(i) is the owner of the real property on or in which the facility 
is located; (ii) did not conduct or permit the generation, transportation, storage, treat-
ment, or disposal of any hazardous substance at the facility; and (iii) did not contribute 
to the release or threat of release of a hazardous substance at the facility through any 
action or omission. This subparagraph (B) does not apply ifthe potentially responsible 
party purchased the real property with actual or constructive knowledge that the 
property was used for the generation, transportation, storage, treatment, or disposal 
of any hazardous substance. (2) The President may provide a covenant not to sue with 
respect to the facility concerned to any party who has entered into a settlement under 
this subsection unless such a covenant would be inconsistent with the public interest 
.... (5) A party who has resolved its liability to the United States under this subsec-
tion shall not be liable for claims for contribution regarding matters addressed in the 
settlement. Such settlement does not discharge any of the other potentially responsible 
parties unless its terms so provide, but it reduces the potential liability of the others 
by the amount of the settlement. 
42 U.S.C. § 9622(g) (1988). CERCLA's de minimis provisions provide a mechanism by which 
PRPs who contributed minimal amounts of hazardous substances to a facility may resolve their 
liability expeditiously. See id. Under § 9622(g)(5), the government may provide PRPs with a 
covenant not to sue, whereby PRPs' liability for matters covered in the agreement are dis-
charged, subject to a reopener clause to cover conditions unknown at the time of the agreement. 
[d. PRPs who settle under § 9622(g) also receive protection against third party contribution 
actions. 42 U.S.C. § 9613(f)(2) (1988). 
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public sewer system authorities for application of the affirmative 
defense.230 
Although CERCLA's third party affirmative defense is intended to 
apply in limited circumstances,231 public sewer system authorities should 
be able to invoke the defense and avoid CERCLA liability for con-
tamination resulting from industrial and commercial discharges.232 A 
public sewer system authority should ordinarily satisfy all five of the 
defense's requirements.233 The requirement that there not exist a 
contractual relationship between the public sewer system authority 
and the third party should present no obstacle to application of the 
affirmative defense. The presence of a contractual relationship fore-
closes application of the affirmative defense only when the contract 
is somehow connected to the conscious handling of hazardous sub-
stances.234 Although public sewer system authorities may possess con-
tractual relationships with their industrial and commercial customers, 
such contracts typically do not cover the disposal of hazardous sub-
stances.235 The requirement that the third party not be an employee 
or an agent of the claimant should also ordinarily be satisfied because 
the focus of concern is contamination caused by the conduct of public 
sewer system authorities' industrial and commercial customers, not 
their agents or employees.236 
A public sewer system authority should ordinarily be able to satisfy 
the requirements that it exercise due care with respect to hazardous 
substances and take precautions against the foreseeable acts and 
omissions of third parties. Appropriate conduct is illustrated by Lin-
coln Properties and Weslfann Associates.237 For example, public sewer 
system authorities should implement and maintain programs for the 
Public sewer system authorities could also attempt to minimize liability if found liable in a 
CERCLA court action by arguing that the court take into account equitable considerations 
when it allocates financial responsibility, as is allowed by 42 U.S.C. § 9613(f)(1) (1988). See supra 
note 34. 
200 See supra notes 186-98 and accompanying text. 
231 See United States v. Argent Corp., 21 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1354, 1356 (D.N.M. 1984). 
232 See, e.g., Lincoln Properties, Ltd. v. Higgins, 823 F. Supp. 1528,1539-43 (E.D. Cal. 1992). 
233 See supra notes 148-59 and accompanying text. 
234 See, e.g., Westwood Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. National Fuel Gas Distrib. Corp., 964 F.2d 85, 
89 (2d Cir. 1992); United States v. Rohm and Haas Co., 790 F. Supp. 1255, 1264 (E.D. Pa. 1992); 
United States v. A & N Cleaners and Launderers, Inc., 788 F. Supp. 1317, 1335 (S.D.N.Y.1992). 
235 See, e.g., Lincoln Properties, 823 F. Supp. at 1543. The court in Westfarm Associates L.P. 
v. International Fabricare Institute did not address the contractual relationship prong of 
CERCLA's affirmative third party defense. 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15921, at *25 n.8 (D. Md. 
July 16, 1993). 
236 See supra note 10. 
237 See supra notes 187-98 and accompanying text. 
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regular inspection and upkeep of sewer systems.238 Public sewer sys-
tem authorities also should take steps to ensure, as much as is eco-
nomically practical,239 that hazardous materials are not discharged 
into sewer systems. Preventative measures should include the insti-
tution of pretreatment and source control programs.240 Although many 
public sewer system authorities possess ordinances that govern the 
release of industrial and commercial wastewater into sewer systems,241 
authorities should verify that ordinances prohibit the discharge of all 
CERCLA hazardous substances. All of these measures should make 
it more likely that a court will find that a public sewer system exer-
cised due care and took reasonable precautions against foreseeable 
third party acts and omissions. 
Finally, applying the proximate cause standard adopted by the 
court in Lincoln Properties,242 the contamination that results from 
hazardous waste discharged into a sewer system by industrial and 
commercial customers would ordinarily be "caused solely by" the 
industrial and commercial customers. Public sewer system authori-
ties' normal conduct or lack thereof will not be the proximate cause 
of the release absent extraordinary circumstances. Although hazard-
ous substances are discharged into the sewer system, the public sewer 
system authority's conduct is normally indirect and insubstantial. 
However, as Wesifarm Properties illustrates, a public sewer system 
authority's conduct and lack thereof can rise to the level of proximate 
cause.243 Negligent upkeep of a sewer system or failure to establish 
adequate safeguards will also fail to meet the "caused solely by" 
requirement because such conduct will place a public sewer system 
238 See West/arm Assocs., 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15921, at *24, *36. 
239 See supra notes 203--D6 and accompanying text on the practical limits of state and municipal 
preventative measures. 
240 See West/arm Assocs., 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15921, at *24. Public sewer system authority 
industrial pretreatment and source control programs reduce contamination in industrial waste-
water. COMMITTEE ON WASTEWATER MANAGEMENT FOR COASTAL URBAN AREAS ET AL., 
MANAGING WASTEWATER IN COASTAL URBAN AREAS 9, 28, 55 (1993). There currently exists 
no federal mandate for public sewer system authorities to implement pollution prevention 
programs. Id. at 298. Nationally, about 12,000 individual industrial firms are covered by federal 
pretreatment requirements, while as many as 200,000 are not. Id. at 401. Of this latter number 
many are subject to local limits which are determined on the basis of NPDES permits for 
pretreatment facilities. Id. 
241 IMHOFF ET AL., supra note 7, at 250. In addition, several cities, in response to the threat 
of CERCLA liability on the basis of sewer system ownership, have changed their regulations 
to more strictly regulate what substances may and may not be disposed into a sewer system. 
See Pulley, supra note 226, at 1. 
242 Lincoln Properties, Ltd. v. Higgins, 823 F. Supp. 1528, 1542-43 (E.D. Cal. 1992). 
243 See West/arm Assocs., 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15921, at *24-25. 
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authority at fault and establish that the authority's acts or omissions 
were more than indirect or insubstantial to the release of hazardous 
substances.244 
B. The Equity Act as a Solution to Public Sewer System Liability 
under CERCLA 
As discussed previously, the Equity Act-a proposed and as of yet 
unenacted amendment to CERCLA-attempts to shield municipali-
ties from CERCLA liability.245 The Equity Act, however, suffers from 
two significant flaws. First, by its own terms, the Equity Act applies 
only to municipalities.246 Thus, state sewer system authorities would 
not be shielded against liability by the proposed amendment's provi-
sions. The second flaw lies in the Equity Act's overbreadth. Under 
the Equity Act, a municipal sewer system authority would be exempt 
from CERCLA costs for the cleanup of hazardous substances re-
leased from sewer pipes owned and maintained by the authority 
regardless of the authority's conduct.247 Thus, even if a municipal 
sewer system authority is negligent or reckless or directly causes 
contamination it is shielded against liability.248 By exempting a munici-
pal sewer system authority even though it may be directly responsi-
ble for contamination, the Equity Act gives municipalities too much 
protection. The Equity Act's broad exemption for municipalities would 
also, in some instances, permit a responsible party to avoid liability. 
Such broad immunity, however, is unfair and is inconsistent with 
CERCLA's purpose of holding those parties who release hazardous 
waste responsible for the resulting clean-up costS.249 
The Equity Act, as it relates to public sewer system authority 
liability, is an improper approach. A more appropriate Congressional 
approach would be to clarify the "caused solely by" language of CER-
CLA's third party affirmative defense so as to employ a proximate 
cause standard and to clarify the availability of the defense to public 
sewer system authorities. The use of a proximate cause standard 
244 See id. at *24-25, *36. 
245 See supra notes 76-85 and accompanying text. 
246 See S. 965, H.R. 2137, l03d Cong., 1st Sess. § 3 (1993); H.R. 2137, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. § 3 
(1993). 
247 See id. 
248 See id. 
249 See supra note 213. Insofar as CERCLA attempts to prevent contamination, absolute 
immunity does not promote the prevention of contamination because municipalities are provided 
with no incentive to take any measures to prevent releases that may invoke CERCLA response 
costs. 
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would provide ample protection to public sewer system authorities 
and would also ensure that public sewer system authorities are held 
accountable for contamination that they are responsible for.250 Even 
more importantly, the adoption of a proximate cause standard will not 
substantially enlarge the third party affirmative defense to the detri-
ment of CERCLA's remedial purpose. Of the three possible standards 
discussed by the court in Lincoln Properties/51 the court found the 
proximate cause standard to be the strictest.252 The proximate cause 
standard will allow a party to meet the "caused solely by" standard 
only in limited situations that fall within CERCLA's purpose to hold 
those responsible for contamination liable for cleanup. In addition, a 
party that asserts CERCLA's third party affirmative defense would 
still have to satisfy the defense's four other requirements in order to 
avoid liability.253 
VI. CONCLUSION 
State and municipal sewer system authorities may be PRPs under 
CERCLA as the owners or operators of contaminated facilities. Pub-
lic sewer system authorities, however, should normally be able to 
invoke successfully the third party affirmative defense to avoid CER-
CLA liability. Wesifarm Associates and Lincoln Properties addressed 
the issue of public sewer system liability and reached different con-
clusions as to liability. The two cases, however, do not conflict with 
one another. Rather, both cases represent the correct approach to 
public sewer system authority liability under CERCLA. Wesifarm 
Associates is an example of an instance in which a public sewer 
system authority failed to take the ordinary steps necessary to defend 
itself against CERCLA liability. The decision should not be inter-
preted as a detrimental expansion of CERCLA liability to public 
sewer system authorities. Courts should recognize that Westfarm 
Associates is not legally inconsistent with Lincoln Properties and that 
the two cases are factually distinguishable. The factual differences, in 
turn, account for the differences in outcome. 
The protection of state and municipality fiscal health favors the 
exclusion of public sewer systems from liability for the conduct of its 
industrial and commercial customers. However, the promotion of eco-
nomic fairness and the desire for consistency with CERCLA's pur-
250 See supra notes 187-91 and accompanying text. 
251 See supra notes 114-18 and accompanying text. 
252 See Lincoln Properties, Ltd. v. Higgins, 823 F. Supp. 1528, 1542 (E.D. Cal. 1992). 
253 See supra notes 93-95 and accompanying text. 
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pose of holding parties who are responsible for contamination liable 
for the resulting cleanup are also important policy concerns. Factor-
ing in these concerns, public sewer system authorities should not 
always be shielded from CERCLA liability. Rather, public sewer 
system authorities should be held liable for the contamination for 
which they are responsible. 
States and municipalities should not have to face potentially enor-
mous costs and possible financial ruin for the conduct of third parties 
when they act responsibly. CERCLA's third party affirmative defense 
constitutes an appropriate safeguard. However, the causation stand-
ard used for the requirement that contamination be "caused solely by" 
third parties is unclear and there is little legislative or judicial guid-
ance as to what is the proper standard to apply. Adopting a construc-
tion similar to that adopted by the court in Lincoln Properties, rather 
than adopting legislation such as the Equity Act, should allow public 
sewer system authorities to avoid liability in appropriate circum-
stances without providing authorities with absolute immunity. 
